Medical Implant Litigation and Failure to Warn: A New Extension for the Learned Intermediary Rule? by Chatfield, Lloyd C., II
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 82 | Issue 2 Article 6
1993
Medical Implant Litigation and Failure to Warn: A
New Extension for the Learned Intermediary Rule?
Lloyd C. Chatfield II
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chatfield, Lloyd C. II (1993) "Medical Implant Litigation and Failure to Warn: A New Extension for the Learned Intermediary Rule?,"
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 82 : Iss. 2 , Article 6.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol82/iss2/6
NOTES
Medical Implant Litigation and
Failure to Warn: A New Extension for
the Learned Intermediary Rule?
INTRODUCTON
Under the learned intermediary rule, the manufacturer of a prescription
drug satisfies its duty to warn by warning the prescribing physician of the
dangers of using the drug. The manufacturer is not required to warn the
ultimate user of the drug-the patient-if adequate warning is given to the
treating physician.1 The learned intermediary rule thus represents an
exception to the general rule that the mantfcturer of a dangerous product has
a duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the products dangers Courts have
articulated a number of rationales for the learned intermediary rule, and the
rule has gained virtually universal acceptance in prescription drug cases
'See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding
that drug manufacturer that adequately warns physician of drug's dangerous qualities
satisfies its duty to warn and is not required to warn public directly). Even if the
manufacturer fails to warn or inadequately warns the physician, the manufacturer might
still escape liability for failure to warn the drug user if the physician would not have
heeded an adequate warning, see Bravinan v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71, 75
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding it to be up to the rier of fact to decide ifthe physician would or
would not have warned the patient had he known of the danger), or if the physician was
independently aware of the dangers, see Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 80 (1st
Cir. 1992) (holding that a doctor's admission that he would not warn patients of the
danger was an intervening-superseding cause of the injuries sustained by the patient);
Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that a
manufacturer's inadequate warning cannot be said to have caused the injury if the
physician already knew of the risk).
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388(c) (1965); infra sources cited note
56.
3 See infra notes 42-70 and accompanying text.
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A number of courts have extended the learned intermediary rule to cases
outside the prescription drug context. In particular, some courts have held that
manufactuem of certain medical devices, including intrauterine devices
("IUD') and breast implants, are governed by the learned intermediary rule:
These courts conclude that the same justifications given for the rule's
application in the prescription drug context warrant its extension to the
analogous field of medical devices.' However, this extension to medical
device cases is not universal, and future challenges will no doubt test the
rule's viability in medical device cases and elsewhere.6 Because these
challenges can be expected to rely in large part on the few narrow exceptions
to the rule that have been recognized, consideration of device cases also
provides a useful vehicle for a reevaluation of the learned intermediary rule
in general.
Some courts have created a limited exception to the learned intermediary
rule in the case of prescription birth control pills.7 These courts have found
that the lessened decision-making role played by the physician in prescribing
birth control pills justifies an exception to the rule and, therefore, requires
manufacturers to warn consumers directly of the dangers associated with birth
control pills.8 Nonetheless, most courts have expressly rejected this distinc-
tion and apply the learned intermediary rule in oral contraceptive cases?
Another exception to the learned intermediary rule involves mass
immunization programs. This exception, founded on the premise that in a
mass immunization setting physicians do not evaluate the needs of each
patient individually, has been widely accepted by the courts." In reliance on
' See infra cases cited note 166.
See, e.g., Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding "no principled basis" on which to distinguish prescription drugs from medical
devices).
6 See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
The learned intermediary rule is itself an exception to the general rle that a
manufacturer of a dangerous product has a duty to warn the ultimate consumer of the
product's dangers. Thus, the birth control and mass immunization program exceptions ame
actually a reversion to the general rule that manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers.
However, for ease of reading and language these will simply be referred to as exceptions
to the learned intermediary rule.
'See inffra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.D.C. 1991)
(noting that the overwhelming majority of decisions apply the learned intermediary nile
in oral contraceptives cases); Reaves v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287,
1290 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (finding no factual basis for concluding that oral contraceptives
differ significantly from other prescription drugs); see also MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 68 n9 (Mass.) (listing oral contraceptive cases in
which the court applied learned intermediary rule), cert. dened, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
'0 See infra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
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the reasoning behind these two exceptions, one court has recently announced
an additional exception to the learned intermediary rule in cases involving
IIDs.11
Subsequent to the development of the oral contraceptives exception, and
again after the recent creation of a similar exception in IUD cases, commenta-
tors heralded the end of the learned intermediary rule. 2 Yet, despite these
exceptions, which are themselves best viewed as anomalies, and cryptic
predictions of the rule pending doom, the learned intermediary rule has not
been significantly eroded. 3 Quite the contrary, time has proven the hardi-
ness of the rule and its adaptability to different applications. The key to the
rule continued viability is that it is founded on sound principles. Critical
reexamination of these principles demonstrates that the rule's continued
application best serves product liability's dual aims of protecting consumers
without unreasonably burdening manufacturers.
This Note considers the continued viability of the learned intermediary
rule, focusing on its applicability to medical device cases. Part I briefly
discusses failure-to-warn jurisprudence and the law of unavoidably unsafe
products.'4 Part II traces the development of the learned intermediary rule,
with particular emphasis on the underlying rationales asserted for its
application. 5 Part III explores the major recognized exceptions to the rule
and examines several arguments asserted by commentators in favor of
abrogating the doctrine altogether."6 Finally, Part IV considers the learned
intermediary rulet applicability to medical devices, with emphasis on its
applicability to IUD and breast implant cases. 7 This Note concludes that the
true justifications for the learned intermediary rule fully support the continued
11 Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1989) (deciding that IUDs
are different than prescription drugs because it is the patient, not the physician, who
decides which method of birth control is desirable); see infra notes 170-200 and
accompanying text
12 See, e.g., Frederick H. Fern, The Decline and Fall of the Learned Intermediay
Doctrine, 28 FoR THE DEFENSE 10, 10 (Sept. 1986); Virginia H. Castleberry, Hill v.
Searle Laboratories: The Decline of the Learned Intermediay Doctrine in Favor ofDirect
Patient Warnings of Drug Product Risky, 43 ARK. L. REv. 821 (1990); see also William
M. Sage, Note, Drug Product Liability and Health Care Delivery S stems, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1007 (1988) (noting 'judicial ... erosion of the learned intennediary
doctrine).
n Margaret GilMooley, Learned Intermediaries, Prescription Drugs, and Patient
Infornation, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 633, 644 (1986) (finding that the learned intermediary
rule remains the general rule).
'4 See infra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
'6 See infra notes 71-165 and accompanying text
' See infra notes 166-242 and accompanying text.
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application of the rule as originally announced and its extension to cases
involving medical devices, including IUDs and breast implants.
. FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS AND
UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCTS
In products liability, a failure-to-warn claim typically alleges that the
manufacturer or seller of a product either knew, or should have known,
of dangers inherent in the use of the product and failed to provide
adequate warning of those dangers to the user of the product."' Most
litigation in this area can be traced to comment j to section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 9 Section 402A generally provides for
strict liability on the part of the manufacturer of a defective product.
Comment j provides that a product may be "unreasonably dangerous,"
and thus subject to strict liability, if the manufacturer does not adequately
warn the user of dangers associated with the product and the manufactur-
er "has knowledge, or... should have knowledge, of the presence of the
... danger."'2 In this sense, it is the failure to warn that constitutes the
defect in the product that gives rise to strict liability.21
Comment k to section 402A creates a significant exception to strict
liability in the case of "unavoidably unsafe products."= Such products
are those "which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use."' The
manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe product can avoid strict liability
if the product is "properly prepared, and accompanied by proper
directions and warning."
2A
Pharmaceutical products generally fall within the definition of
unavoidably unsafe products.' In fact, all of the examples given in
'I See RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cnt. j (1965).
19 Id.
2 Id.
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Hoffimian-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1992)
("a product may be unreasonably dangerous if the manufacturer fails to warn of a non-
obvious risk); Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
"defect' nied not be a matter of errors in manufacture, and that a product is 'defective'
when it is ... not accompanied by adequate instructions and warning of the dangers
attending its use").
2 RESTATIMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cnt. k (1965).
23 Id.
7A Id. (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980)
("Unlike most other products ... prescription drugs may cause untoward side effects
despite the fact that they have been carefully and properly manufactured."); Wolfgruber
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comment k to section 402A of the Restatement are medical products,'
and courts often limit the unavoidably unsafe product classification to
medical products For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that medical
devices, including IUDs and breasts implants, are unavoidably unsafe
products. This assumption helps isolate the application of the learned
intermediary rule from issues concerning defective productss and
comports with case law on the subject.e
A manufacturer's duty to warn entails several elements. Substantively,
the manufacturer must provide warnings of all known risks and their
relative magnitude, which might include a duty to warn of even remote
risks in the prescription drug context. The warning must be phrased in
clear language and otherwise communicated in a manner likely to ensure
its effectiveness. Finally, the warning must be adequately directed to the
appropriate audience. Generally, the appropriate audience will be the
product user. In the case of prescription drugs, however, the manufacturer
typically must direct the warning to the treating physician under the
learned intermediary mle.'
In the learned intermediary context, it is important to consider failure-
to-warn claims as a distinct cause of action from products liability suits
that are based on design defects or defective manufacture. Courts
generally limit the application of the learned intermediary rule to failure-
to-warn cases and will not absolve a manufacturer of liability for a
defective product due to the negligence of an intervening physician."
v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (1979) (acknowledging that prescription drugs are
"unavoidably unsafe products").
2 RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cnt. IL
See Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Sbrict Liability: What
Liability Rule Should be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceuical Products?, 78 KY. L.J.
705, 714-15 (1989-90) (noting that courts have generally been quite reluctant to extend
comment k to nonmedical products).
' In reality, of course, such a nice distinction is rarely available. Indeed, "[tihe
theories of strict liability, the comment k defense to strict liability, negligence and breach
of warranty often merge, particularly when it concerns the legal significance of the
adequacy of the warnings given." Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir.
1989).
See cases cited infra note 166.
30 Ausness, supa note 27, at 717-19.
31 See McPheron v. Searle Lab., Inc., 888 F.2d 31, 34 (5th Cir. 1989) (comparing
cases limiting the learned intermediary rule to warning cases with those indicating a
further extension of the rule to apply to defects claims). The McPheron court noted that
it had, in a case applying Mississippi law, "stated that 'the learned intermediary doctrine
applies only to the inadequate warning claims; it does not address design defects."' Id.
(citing Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173, 1180 (5th Cir. 1988)). The court also noted
a California Supreme Court ruling that "in California, strict liability attaches only if a
1993-94]
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The policy objectives served by the learned intermediary rule as applied
to failure-to-warn claims do not support a similar rule requiring physi-
cians to warrant the actual fitness of a product.'
Some courts and commentators group warnings into two basic
categories: risk-reduction warnings and informed-choice warnings.' As
the names imply, such warnings either promote safer use by ensuring a
better-informed user or simply provide sufficient information to aid the
user in deciding whether to use the product. Professors James Henderson,
Jr., and Aaron Twerski analogize this distinction to the distinction
between medical malpractice cases based on negligent conduct and those
based on informed consent and assert that courts fail to recognize the
distinction between risk-reduction and informed-choice warnings.'
Henderson and Twerski suggest that significant policy differences
between the two types of warnings might warrant greater judicial
sensitivity to the distinction in assessing liability for failure to warn 5
Although traditional failure-to-warn jurisprudence typically has
involved risk-reduction warnings, informed-choice warning theory
probably predominates in the case of unavoidably unsafe drugs and
devices.' The most significant factor contributing to this conclusion is
the basic nature of therapeutic drug treatment. In taking medication or
receiving a medical implant, particular methods of use or other user-
controlled factors are generally negligible; such usage, once undertaken,
involves a degree of risk generally unassociated with any actions of the
user beyond ingestion. The amount of the drug taken and the manner in
manufacturer fails to provide an adequate warning to the physician regarding the risks and
potential side effects of the drug." Id. (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477
(Cal. 1988)). Additionally, the court in McPheron noted two conflicting federal district
court opinions reaching opposite conclusions regarding the viability. of a design defect
claim for an IUD when a learned intermediary had intervened. Id. at 33 (citing Hill v.
Searle Lab., 686 F. Supp. 720, 725-26 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (learned intermediary rule bars
defect claim), and Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-50 (D. Or. 1989)
(learned intermediary rule does not bar design defect claim)). See also Bukowski v.
Coopervision Inc., 592 N.Y.S.2d 807, 847 n.3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (CThe informed
intermediary doctrine, by its very scope and definition, has no application to a design
defect cause of action.").
37 See infra notes 49-70 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting
the distinction between 'preventable risk warnings" and "unavoidable risk warnings");
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability:
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 285-99 (1990).
' See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 286.
Id. at 288-89.
Cf. id. at 286 ("Informed-choice warning litigation is generally limited to
prescription drugs and cosmetics .. ." (footnote omitted)).
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which it is ingested are predetermined by the physician. The patient's only
input is generally whether to take the medication or have the device
installed-the so-called "take it or leave it" theory.37 Thus, in the typical
scenario, warnings given to the patient do not reduce the risks to the
patient but, rather, merely ensure that the patient is adequately informed
of the risks of using a product before consenting to its use. Although this
distinction has not received a great deal of attention in the context of
medical device cases, the distinction clearly supports the application of
the learned intermediary rule in device cases.'
The learned intermediary rule does not relate to the type of warning
given or to the adequacy of the warnings given. Instead, the rule concerns
only the issue of to whom the warning must be given. Thus isolated, the
issue is whether the manufacturer of an unavoidably unsafe medical
device should be liable to a consumer who received the product from a
physician-intermediary when the manufacturer has adequately warned this
physician-intermediary of the product's dangers.
II. THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
Modem commentators tmce the current learned intermediary rule to the
case of Sterling Drug, Inc v. Cornis&31 In fac, the rule announced in
Sterling was not so much a new rule as it was the first clear articulation of
principles that had been applied in prescription drug cases for some time.Y
In the years since Sterling, the doctrine has been refined and extended to
areas outside the prescription drug context!' Different courts and commenta-
tors have proffered varying justifications for the application and expansion of
17 Id. at 285.
u See infra notes 183 & 213 and accompanying text.
3" 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that drug manufacturer that warns
physician of drug's dangers has no duty to warn general public); see Gilhooley, supra note
13, at 643; Barbara Pope Flannagan, Comment, Products Liability: The Continued
Viability of the Learned Interediry Rule As It Applies to Product Warnings for
Prescription Drugs, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 405, 410 (1986).
40 See, e.g., Love v. Wol, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183, 192 (Ct. App. 1964) ("Parke-Davis has
no contact with the ultimate consumer of the drug, the patient. The duty, therefore,
whatever its extent may be, must be a duty to warn the doctor who prescribes the drug.");
Marcus v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509-10 (1948) (holding that
manufacturer satisfied duty to warn by providing adequate warnings to treating physician);
see also Flamagan, supra note 39, at 410 n.27.




the learned intermediay rle. Only through analysis of these rationales can
the rule's utility in other contexts be appropriately evaluated.
A. The Superseding Cause Rationale
Causation is perhaps the most appealing label courts utilize in immuniz-
ing manufacturers who provide adequate warnings to the prescribing
physician from failure-to-warn claims. An adequately warned physician who
fails to pass the warning on to his patient constitutes a superseding cause
between the manufacturer and the patient42 This causation rationale is
appealing because it is based on the familiar tort concept that a tortfeasor is
liable only for the injuries that he or she proximately causes! 3
Despite its appeal, one problem with using the causation rationale is the
inherent difficulty of establishing causation in failure-to-warn cases as
compared with other product liability claims. In a typical defective design
case, a plaintiff points to the existence of a viable alternative design and
asserts that the manufacturr's failure to use that design proximately caused
the plaintiffs injury." Failure-to-warn claims, however, entail a different sort
of showing. A plaintiff suing under a failure-to-warn theory must presumably
establish that she would have heeded an adequate warning if one were
given.45 Due to the individualized nature of the inquiry into what warning
' See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 79 (1st Cir. 1992) (recognizing
the "principle that where a treating physician knows of the risks associated with a drug
but does not pass that warning along to the patient, the doctor's decision not to warn
constitutes an intervening, superseding cause of the patient's harm" (citation omitted));
Beyette v. Ortho Pharnaceutical Corp., 823 F.2d 990, 993 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that,
even if warning received by patient was inadequate, adequately warned doctor's failure
to pass warning on to patient constituted intervening, superseding cause between
maufcturer's alleged failure to warn and injury); Zanzri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F.
Supp. 1511, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that a "properly warned physician ...
becomes a 'learned intermediary' operating to break the causal link" between the drug
manufacturer and the consumer); MacDonald v. Ortho pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d
65, 68 (Mass.) (holding that under learned intermediary doctrine, 'the manufacturer's
immunity ... is explicable on the grounds that the intermediary's failure to warn is a
superseding cause of the consumer's injury" (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920
(1985).
43 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 5 (1965).
44 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 304-05 (comparing causation element
in defects cases and failure-to-warn cases).
45 See id. at 305. In fact, as Henderson and Twerski note, courts have faced a
dilemma in resolving the causation issue in failure-to-warn cases. Because causation in
such cases is highly speculative, courts that might appropriately take many, if not most,
cases from the jury instead tend to "defer to juries' discretion." Id. at 305-06. Thus, "Itihe
plaintif's causational case is made excessively easy because any other reaction would
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would have caused the plainti fto alter her behavior, Professors Henderson
and Twerski suggest that "predicting how additional information would have
affected any given individual may be well nigh impossible."'
Obviously, the causation issue is made more difficult in the case of a
m ufacturer that has in fact warned of the dangers associated with a product,
but has extended that warning to a physician rather than directly to the
patient. In this situation, a plainti might allege that the manufacturers failure
to warn her directly was the cause of her injury!f The manufacturer will
then respond that the physician legal and ethical obligations required him to
exercise his medical judgment in determining what information to share with
the patient. Thus, the manufacturer will claim that any inadequacies in the
warning given to the patient are the result of the p hysician failure to satisfy
his duty and were not caused by the manufacturer.
The essential problem with an intervening cause rationale is that it
necessarily assumes the absence of a duty on the part of the manufacturer to
communicate a warning directly to the consumer/patient and, therefore, begs
the question of whether a duct warning should be required. Obviously, if
there were a duty to warn the patient directly, the manufacturer could not
satisfy it merely by warning the physician. Thus, rather than being a mere
shorthand reference for an existing legal rule, the learned intermediary rule
is a rule based on public policy.
B. The Manufacturer-Doctor-Patient Relationship
As one court has noted, the "entire system of drug distribution in
America is set up so as to place the responsibility of distribution and use
make the case unacceptably difficult" Id. at 306.
"Id. at 307 (citation omitted). However, it might prove easier to establish how
additional or different warnings affect a physician's course of action, if only because
doctors, unlike the general populace, share common training and terminology.
Tie plaintiff might allege that the warning to the physician was itself inadequate.
This would give the plaintiff a valid failure-to-warn claim, the learned intermediary rule
notwithstanding, since the warning to the doctor was for the plaintiffs benefit. See, e.g.,
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Mass.) (noting that ."the
duty of the ethical [prescription] drug manufacturer is to warn the doctor, rather than the
patient, [although] the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a breach of such
duty' (second alteration in original)) (quoting McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
528 P.2d 522 (Or. 1974)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985). For purposes of this
discussion, it is assumed that the treating physician was fully apprised of the dangers
associated with the drug but failed to pass the waming on to the patient.
4' See Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[Mledical ethics
and practice dictate that the doctor must be an intervening and independent party between
patient and drug manufacture.).
1993-94]
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upon professional people.'"49 By definition and by law, prescription drugs
can be obtained only through a prescription by a licensed physician Thus,
there is necessarily an intervening party between the manufacturer and the
consumer, and that party-a physician-is independently required by law to
adequately inform the patient of the risks associated with the treatment
provided." However, the mere existence of a physician-intermediary does
not alone justify absolving the manufacturer, since it is common to allow
parties to share liability for a single wrong 2 Rather, the nature of the
"' Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
'0 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (1992); see Swayze v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 466
(5th Cir. 1987) ("Prescription drugs, on the other hand, due to their potency or unusual
characteristics, are dispensed only upon a doctor's order."); MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at
73 (noting that "by definition, before a consumer uses a prescription drug, that consumer
must have some interaction with a doctor" (citation omitted)).
This requirement is generally considered part of the doctrine of informed consent.
The physician's "obligation reflects principles of individual autonomy and rests on the
premise 'that every person has the right to determine what shall be done to his own
body."' Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 654 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
780 (D.C. Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)). See also Barbara
Marticelli McGarey, Comment, Phawmaceudical Manufacurers and Consumer-Directed
Informafion-Enhancing the Safety of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CA . U. L. REv. 117,
119 (1984) ("The exact content of the information [patients] receive is left to the health
professional's discretion. Liability for inadequate disclosure is based on the doctrine of
informed consent."). See generally Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 653-58 (discussing
evolution of the informed consent doctrine and the modem emphasis on patient
autonomy).
'2 See REsTATSMaNT (SEcoND) OF TORITS § 879 (1965). Courts and commentators
calling for abrogation of the learned intermediary rule have noted that warnings provided
directly to the patient from the manufacturer would be supplemental to the warnings
already owed by the treating physician. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass.) ("Thus, the manufacture's duty is to provide to the
consumer written warnings conveying reasonable notice of the nature, gravity, and
likelihood of known or knowable side effects, and advising the consumer to seek fuller
explanation from the prescribing physician. . . ."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985);
Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 686; McGarey, supra note 51, at 140 ("Thus, consumer-
directed labeling would neither replace the physician's responsibility to communicate
warnings nor replace the learned intermediary system of apportioning liability.'). Cf.
Prescription Drug Products: Patient Package Insert Requirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754,
at 60,762-63 (1980) ("Patient package inserts are not intended to be a substitute for the
information provided by the patient's physician .... Instead, their purpose is to
supplement that instruction ... ."), repealed by Prescription Drug Products; Revocation
of Patient Package Insert Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (1982). The patient package
insert initiahve, which would have required written inserts on certain prescription drugs
for distribution to patients, was aborted by the Reagan Administration. See Gilhooley,
supra note 13, at 665-68.
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physician-patient relationship forms the foundation of the learned
intermediary rule.
A treating physician is presumed to do more than merely distribute drugs.
His or her primary duty is to treat the patient. Of course, a significant portion
of this duty involves the prescription of drugs to patients.53 In prescribing
medication for a patient, a physician considers not only the relevant attributes
of the pharmaceutical product, but also the needs and characteristics of the
individual patient. This is, in essence, the rationale for prescription drugs:
because they are too potentially dangerous to be available to the public at
large, prescription drugs must be distributed by learned professionals who
understand both the product and the patient.-' Since the only means by
which patients can receive prescription drugs is through a physician, the
learned intermediary rule recuires the manufacturer to warn the treating
physician, not the patient. What is supposed to transpire from that point has
been a matter of some debate.
Many courts and commentators who have considered the learned
intermediary rule envision a filtering effect, whereby the physician will tailor
"' For example, as early as 1978, U.S. doctors wrote 751 million new prescriptions
and 658 million refills. PHARMACEUTICAL MANACTURERS AsSOCIATION, PRSCIuPTION
DRUG INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 15-16, 55 (1980). This number has grown to 1.6 billion
prescriptions each year. See Milt Freudenheim, F.D.A. Gets Tough on Drugs Offered for
Unproved Uses, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1991, Financial Desk, § 1, at 1.
' As the court noted in Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974):
As a medical expert; the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is the
task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers.
The choice he makes is an informed one, an individual medical judgment
bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.
See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1992) ("The rationale
underlying the prescription drug rule is that the prescribing physician, as the 'learned
intemiediary' standing between the manufacturer and consumerlpatient, is generally in the
best position to evaluate the potential risks and benefits of ingesting a certain drug and
to advise the patient accordingly."); see also Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 659 ("The
[Food and Drug Administration] was conerned that '[many drugs of great value to the
physician are dangerous inthe hands of those unskilled inthe uses of the drugs."' (second
alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting F.DA. Ann. Rep. (1939), reprinted in
FOOD LAw INST., FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG & CosMEnc LAW, 1907-49 ADMiN. REPs. 929
(1951))); Flannagan, supra note 39, at 413 ("It is the physician who has the education and
expertise to understand the mass of information provided by drug manufacturers
concerning the benefits and risks of [a particular drug].. . . A physician is in a better
position than the manufacturer to know the needs of a particular patient"); Sage, supra
note 12, at 990 ('The chemistry of the [patient] may contribute to an adverse drug
reaction ... as much as the chemistry of the drug....'I.
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the warnings provided by the manufacturer to fit the needs of a given
patient' The physician thus takes the place of the manufacturer by
assuming the duty to warn.5 Under the filtering model, the physician
exercises his judgment in determining not only which dangers the patient
should be informed of, but also how best to inform the patient. Perfor-
mance of this task requires the physician to have considerable knowledge
of the individual patient, knowledge that the manufacturer cannot be
expected to possess.
One advantage of allowing the physician to serve a filtering fumction
between the manufacturer and the patient is the increased effectiveness
of the warnings given. Too far removed from any individual patient to
discern which of the potentially numerous warnings are appropriate or
even necessary in a given case, the manufacturer's natural reaction would
be to warn.every patient of every conceivable risk. As noted by Profes-
sors Henderson and Twerski:
The most significant social cost generated by requiring distributors to
warn against remote risks is the reduced effectiveness of potentially
helpful warnings directed towards risks which are not remote. Bombard-
" See, e.g., Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992)
("Under [the learned intermediary] doctrine, the manufacturer's duty to warn extends only
to the prescribing physician, who tham assumes responsibility for advising the individual
patient of risks associated with the drug or device."; Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064,
1070 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the learned intermediary rule ... assumes that it is
reasonable for a manufacturer to rely on the prescribing physician to forward to the
patient, who is the ultimate user of the drug products, any warnings regarding their
possible side effects"); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984)
("It is the physician's duty to remain abreast of product characteristics and, exercising an
informed professional judgment, decide which facts should be told to the patient");
Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 642 ("IThe courts continue to invoke the 'leamed
intermediary' doctrine to allow drug manufacturers to rely on an intermediary-the
prescribing physician--to warn consumers about the risks involved in their use of a
particular drug" (citation omitted)); McGarey, supra note 51, at 119 ("[Plhysicians,
because of their education and experience, can best receive, understand and disseminate
[information about prescription drugs].. . .Thus, consumnrs must obtain almost all of the
information necessary for the safe use of prescription drugs through their doctor....").
' Generally, the manufacturer of a dangerous product has the duty to warn
consumers of dangers associated with the product See Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748
F. Supp. 1511, 1514 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that mainfacturers generally must warn
consumers but noting the learned intermediary exception); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 388(c) (1965) (stating that a manufacturer must exercise reasonable care to make
known dangerous aspects of the product); W. PAGE KEEON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 207 n.47 & § 99(2), at 697 (5th ed. 1984) (manufacturers
generally must warn of the risks of dangerous products).
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ed with nearly useless warnings about risks that rarely materialize in
harm, many consumers could be expected to give up on warnings
altogether.f
The warnings to which Professors Henderson and Twerski refer are
considered "nearly useless" because they pertain to remote risks.
Presumably, such risks can be remote either by having a low incidence
rate generally or by threatening only limited groups of patients. In either
case, but particularly where certain identifiable groups are at risk, the
physician's familiarity with the patient allows for effective targeting of
warnings, thereby reducing the risk that patients will be overwhelmed by
warnings.
In sharp contrast to the threat that consumers who are inundated with
warnings will turn their backs on warnings altogether is the risk that some
consumers will "continue to take warnings seriously in an environment
crowded with warnings of remote risks [and will] probably overreact,
investing too heavily in their versions of 'safety."''  Again, the physi-
cian's proximity to his or her patient allows him or her to alleviate the
risks of overwarning. A similar justification for treating the physician as
a conduit through which warnings are relayed to the patient is the concern
that, in some cases, patients should not be informed of risks for therapeu-
tic reasons.59 Thus, by filtering a complete catalog of risks associated
with a particular drug through the treating physician, the warning
eventually given to patients will be more effective and better for the
patient than would be direct manufacturer-to-patient warnings.'
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 296 (citation omitted).
Id.; see also Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 644-45 (taking note of the argument that
labeling directed to consumers might 'ighten patients so that they would not take
necessary medications").
" See, e.g., BrookN, 750 F.2d at 1232. As the Broolc court noted:
One in a serious medical condition of the sort experienced by Brooks as
a general matter faces unwanted, unsettling and potentially harnful risks if
advice, almost inevitably involved and longwinded, from non-physicians,
conlaiy to what the doctor of his choice has decided should be done, must be
supplied to him duning the already stessfd period shortly before his nip to the
operating room.
6' See MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 74 (Mass.)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (asserting that the learned intermediary rule, coupled with the
physician's duty to secure the patient's informed consent, would "best ensure that a
prescription drug user will receive in the most effective manner the information that she




Though widely espoused, the filtering theory has been explicitly
rejected in some quarters. Critics of the filtering approach maintain that
the physician is not an intermediary who assumes the manufacturer's duty
to warn the consumer. Instead, these critics assert that the physician is the
consumer." This interpretation of the learned intermediary rule contem-
plates a physician who, having received adequate warning from the
manufacturer, independently weighs the risks and benefits of a particular
drug in deciding whether to prescribe it for a patient.' Under this
theory, the- physician, in effect, takes the place of the patient, not the
manufacturer, in the duty-to-wam context. The physician receives the
warning, weighs the risks against the benefits, and determines whether the
use of the drug is warranted. As in the context of a physician who filters
information for the patient, a physician who acts as the consumer for the
patient must have considerable knowledge of the individual patient in
order to perform this role properly.63
The learned intermediary rule is thus susceptible to two significantly
different constructions: the filtering versus the substituted consumer
approaches. As with any theoretical distinction, however, courts often mix
the models, defining the rule-and the physician's role-to entail both
See McPheron v. Searle Lab., Inc., 888 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1989) ("lhe
prescribing physician acts as a 'learned intermediary' who detennines whether the drug
is appropriate for the patient." (citation omitted)); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F.
Supp. 1511, 1515 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[Ihe prescribing physician, acting as a 'learned
intermediary' between the manufacturer and the consumer, weighs the potential benefits
against the dangers in deciding whether to recommend the drug to meet the patient's
needs." (citation omitted)).
The physician-as-consumer position was put forth most forcefully in Robert M.
McKenna, Comment, The Impact of Product Liability Law on the Development of a
Vaccine Against the A/DS V rus, 55 U. CEL L. REV. 943, 959 (1988). Responding to the
assertion in Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 637, that drug manufacturers should be required
"to provide adequate information about a drug's risks directly to the drug user," McKenna
stated.
This argument misconstrues the learned intermediary doctrine. The doctrine
does not assume the physician will substitute for the drug manufacturer as a
conduit of warnings to the drug user. Rather, it is the physician who is the
consumer by makng the decision whether the patient should use a given drug
.... Hence, whether warnings ultimately reach the patient is irrelevant under
the doctrine. The relevant issue is whether the drug manufacturer adequately
warned the physician of the drug's risks.
McKenna, supra, at 959. See also Sage, spra note 12, at 1000 ("A problem with
applying traditional liability rules to drugs is that the true 'consumer' of prescription drugs
is the physician, not the patient.").




functions." This commingling of constructions is entirely appropriate.
While critics of the filtering model are correct in noting that the learned
intermediary rule per se is not dependent upon warnings actually reaching
the patient,65 the physician's duty to obtain the patient's informed
consent prior to treatment!' is an ineluctable backdrop to any failure-to-
warn claim involving pharmaceuticals. That the manufacturer may be able
to demur to a patient's failure-to-warn claim does not negate the
significance of the physician's duty to warn, as it is clear that many courts
consider the physician's duty an indispensable element of the learned
intermediary rule.'
C. Efficiency Rationales
The other justifications given for the learned intermediary rule are in
some form or another related to the special relationship between the
physician and patient discussed above. These include the difficulty a
manufacturer would face in distributing information directly to the
patient the complexity of the warning information and difficulty
"See Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1992) ('ie rationale
underlying the prescription drug rule is that the prescribing physician, as the 'learned
intermediary' standing between the manufacturer and consumer/patient, is generally inthe
best position to evaluate the potential risks and benefits of ingesting a certain drug and
to advise the patient accordingly."); Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th
Cir. 1984) ("Once adequate warnings are given to the physician, the choice of treatment
and the duty to disclose properly fall on the doctor."); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775
F. Supp. 417, 422-23 (D.D.C. 1991) ("[Tjhe pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty is to
adequately infonn the physician, who is 'expected to function as a learned intermediary"
between the company and the patient in protecting the patient and in providing direct
information about the drug to the patient."') (quoting WAILAM J. CtJRAN ET AL.,
HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIc SCIENCE, AND PUBIuc PoLiCY 1198 (4th ed. 1990));
Tednme v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978) ("It is [the physician's]
duty to inform himself of the qualities and characteristics of [prescription products] ....
and to exercise an independent judgment, taking into account his knowledge of the patient
as well as the product ... The physician decides what facts should be told to the
patient.").
' See McKenna, supra note 61, at 959 (noting that the learned intermediary rule
does not simply assume that the physician will act as a conduit for information).
6See MacPherson, 775 F. Supp. at 423 ("At a minimum ... a physician must
disclose to a patient, inter alia, 'the nature of the proposed treatment ... and the nature
and degree of risks and benefits inherent in undergoing and in abstaining from the
proposed treatment."') (quoting Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. 1982)).
See cases cited supra notes 54-55.
See Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[Uit is virtually
impossible inmany cases for a manufacturer to directly warn each patient."); Sage, supra
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translating that information into layman's terms,69 and the risk of
interference with the doctor-patient relationship." Together, these
justifications bolster the conclusion that in the typical case, the physician
is in the best position to warn the patient and is also best able to ensure
that warnings are effective. Conversely, the mnuitcturer would face
considerable obstacles in striving to satisfy a duty to warn patients
directly and is much more suited to the task of warning the physician.
Thus, the continued application of the learned intermediary rule in
prescription drug and pharmaceutical device cases clearly offers the better
course.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY RULE
The learned intermediary rule has been adopted in some form or
another by virtually every jurisdiction that has considered it.71 Despite
this overwhelming acceptance of the rule by the courts, the majority of
commentators either urge the creation or expansion of exceptions to the
rule, or call for a total abrogation of the rule.' These entreaties have
note 12, at 1007 n.74 ("The major arguments for waring only the physician are the
doctor-patient relationship and logistical problems of direct communication between
maufacturers and patients.") (citing Britain, Product Honesty Is the Best Policy: A
Comparison of Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risl and the
Importance of Consumer Expectations in Determining Product Defet, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
342, 375-76 (1984) and Victoria J. Kiacke, Note, Oral Contraceptives: Heading Into an
Era of Unpreictabilty, Unlimited Liability, and Unavailability?, 19 IND. L. REV. 615,
618-21 (1986)).
o See Hill, 884 F.2d at 1070 ("]he information regarding risks is often too
technical for a patient to make a reasonable choice."); Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d
1264, 1276 (5th Cir.) ("Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric
in formula and varied in effect."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
7' See Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 645 (noting that such broad requirements "could
potentially cause undue interference with the doctor-patient relationship") (citing In re
Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 883 (Mich. 1984)); Flannagan, supra note 39, at
413 (finding that the doctor-patient relationship could be put at risk) (citing Dunkin v.
Syntex Lab., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977)).
' See Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 644 (citing In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d
873, 881, 881 n.4 (Mich. 1984)); McKenna, supra note 61, at 958 ("Every jurisdiction
that has considered whether a drug manufacturer has a duty to warn has adopted the
doctrine.") (citing Flamagan, supra note 39, at 411 n.32). McKenna places the number
of states adopting the rule at forty-three. See id. at 958 n.68. Suffice it to say that the rule
has received widespread acceptance.
7' See, e.g., Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 637 ("[P]rescription drug manufacturers
should be required under state tort law to provide adequate information about a drug's
risks directly to the drug user."); Flannagan, supra note 39, at 423 ("Where a warning can
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usually fallen on deaf ears. However, significant exceptions to the rule
have been created for vaccinations and oral contraceptives.' Some of
the policy grounds behind these exceptions will no doubt fuel further
challenges to the rule, particularly in the context of breast implant and
IUD litigation. 4 For this reason, this part of the Note first examines the
existing exceptions to the rule and next considers the proffered justifica-
tions for creating additional exceptions to the learned intermediary rule
or for abandoning the rule altogether.
A. The Mass Immunization Exception
The most widely applied exception to the learned intermediary rule
involves the use of vaccines in mass immunization programs. This
exception was first noted in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,75 soon after
the learned intermediary rule itself was first recognized.76 In Davis, the
plaintiff allegedly contracted polio from a vaccine administered at a
public health clinic. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant manufactur-
er's attempt to invoke the learned intermediary rule, determining that
"without an individualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved
.... it is the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings
reach the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by obligating the
purchaser to give warning." The reasoning applied in Davis was
adopted six years later by the Fifth Circuit in Reyes v. Wyeth Laborato-
ries.
79
The rulings in Davis and Reyes represent explicit exceptions to the
learned intermediary rule, because both courts recognized that vaccines
readily be conveyed in lay person's language, a drug manufacturer's failure to warn the
consumer directly should result in liability for any injuries to the consumer proximately
caused by use of the drug." (footnote omitted)); McGarey, mzqra note 51, at 151 (calling
for "[a] multi source system for the communication of prescription drug information to
consumers" based primarily on the perceived inadequacies of the learned intermediary
rule).
See infra notes 75-142 and accompanying text.
v See infra notes 169-216 and accompanying text.
7' 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
76 See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that
a manufacturer has a duty to warn doctors of possible side effects of prescription drugs
since the doctor can understand and apply the warning in his role as a learned
intennediary between the mamfacturer and the patient); spra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
Davis, 399 F.2d at 131.
71 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
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are generally classified as prescription drugs and that manufacturers of
prescription drags generally must warn only the prescribing physician."
The difference with vaccines, at least as administered to the patients in
Davis and Reyes, is that:
Where there is no physician to make an "individualized balancing ...
of the risks", ... the very justification for the prescription drug
exception evaporates. Thus, as in the case of patent drugs sold over the
counter without prescription, the manufacturer of a prescription drug
who knows or has reason to know that it will not be dispensed as [a
prescription] drug must provide the consumer with adequate information
so that he can balance the risks and benefits of a given medication
himself!'0
The validity of the vaccine exception is evident in the Reyes court's
discussion of the defendant's attempts to distinguish the facts of Reyes
from those in Davis. In Reyes, defendant Wyeth Laboratories offered four
grounds on which to distinguish its case factually from Davis:
First, the appellant argues, Davis received his vaccine during a mass
immunization program, whereas Anita Reyes ingested her vaccine at her
parents' request. Second, Wyeth stresses the fact that Davis received his
vaccine from a pharmacist, but Reyes' was administered by a public
health nurse. Third, Wyeth's active participation in the mass
immunization program involved in the Davis case is contrasted to its
relatively passive role here. Finally, Wyeth urges that unlike the
situation in Davis, here it had no knowledge that the vaccine would not
be administered as a prescription drug."'
Rejecting these distinctions, the Reyes court emphasized that "Wyeth had
ample reason to foresee the way in which its vaccine would be distribut-
ed" and hinted that absent such foreseeability, the case might have been
legitimately distinguishable from Davis.
2
See id.; Davis, 399 F.2d at 130.
£0 Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276 (first omission in original) (quoting Davis, 399 F.2d at
131).
" Id. at 1277.
'1 Id. The issue of the manufacturer's ability to foresee the absence of a learned
intermediary is controlling in many cases. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341,
1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that it is foreseeable that a nurse would administer the drug
without physician supervision and that the mamfacturer thus had a duty to warn the
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Just as the mass immunization exception recognizes the inapplicabili-
ty of the learned intermediary rule when there is no intervening physician,
when a physician does play a meaningful role in prescribing the
drug/vaccine the exception has no place, and the learned intermediary rule
should apply.' This "meaningful role" might entail simply being present
in a supervisory capacity after the establishment of a physician-patient
relationship." The mass immunization exception thus underscores the
prominent role of the doctor-patient relationship in the learned intermedi-
ary context: the existence or absence of this relationship controls the
applicability of the mass immunization exception.
Although accepted universally and grounded in the legitimate basis
that immunizations are often administered without intervention by a
learned intermediary, the mass immunization exception is costly in certain
respects. In particular, the cessation of production of some vaccines can
be traced to manufacturers' unwillingness to expose themselves to
unpredictable and unavoidable liability for failure to warn.' The
uncertainty intimidating these manufacturers is that failure-to-warn claims
leave to a jury the decision of whether a warning was adequate. This
decision is made on the facts of the individual case and can easily fail to
account for the practical limitations involved in providing warnings and
patient directly); Mazur v. Merck & Co., 767 F. Supp. 697, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1991) ("The
issue of whether or not the reasonableness standard has been met will most likely turn on
the issue of foreseeability, (i.e..... 'was it foreseeable that a learned intermediary would
not be present at inoculation?')").
" See, e.g., Hurley v. Lederle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that where "the child's personal physician prescribed the shot, and the vaccine was
administered under the supervision of the physician in his office by his nurse," the mass
immunization exception was inapplicable).
" See Swayze v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
despite the physician's apparently unlawful delegation of duty to deternine proper dosage
of anesthetic, the physician still constituted a learned intermediary); Hurley, 863 F.2d at
1179. But see Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying mass
immunization exception despite the fact that private physician administered the vaccine
because physician's office was ra much like a public clinic).
" See Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 648 n.77 (noting that "[the liability of the
vaccine manufacturers has had an impact on the availability of vaccines .. :"). As
Professor Gilhooley explained-
One reason why many manufacturers of vaccines have ceased production is
because prospective liability outweighs prospective profits. The liability
problems of vaccine manufacturers may be attributable, in part, to the treatment
of vaccines under tort law as an exceptional drug for which manufacturers must
provide patient warnings.
Id. at 689 (citation omitted); see also Sage, supra note 12, at 990 n.6 ("A 'liability
insurance crisis' has forced many companies to stop producing vaccines.').
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the potential noneconomic costs involved in adding or changing even a
single word or phrase in the warning information provided." Juries
often erroneously conclude that giving an additional or different warning
to the individual patient would have cost the manufacturer almost nothing
and would have prevented considerable harm.' In the face of such
potentially absolute liability, manufacturers can, and have, decided to exit
the market altogether, at untold cost to the public.
B. The Oral Contraceptive Exception
The mass immunization exception was recognized very soon after the
learned intermediary rule itself was announced,' allowing the two rules
to develop harmoniously. Conversely, the other noted excep-
tion--involving oral contraceptives-was created relatively recently and has
been accepted by a very small minority of courts.
The first court to recognize an exception to the learned intermediary rule
for oral contraceptives was the Massachusetts Supreme Court in MacDonald
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp." Plaintifl Carole MacDonald, alleged that
the warning that she had received with her birth control pills, which
warned of a risk of "abnormal blood clotting which can be fatal' and
"may threaten life if the clots break loose and then lodge in the ...
brain"'' was inadequate due to its failure to specifically warn of the risk
of stroke.'
"Cf. Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting
that "[tihe primary cost is, in fact, the increase in time and effort required for the user to
grasp the message" and that "[tihe inclusion of each extra item dilutes the punch of every
other item").
" Courts are sometimes sensitive to this problem. See Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
979 F.2d 1001, 1003-04 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[a]ny alternative warning that
[plaintiff] proposes must bear some reasonable relation to the 1.84% risk [of ijury]'); see
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 296-303.
" See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (recognizing,
for the first time, the learned intermediary rule); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d 121,
130-31 (9th Cir. 1968) (recognizing an exception to the learned intermediary rule where
the vaccine is distributed at ,mass clinics").
475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985), cert. dem'ed, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
Id. at 66 (footnote omitted).
91 Id. at 67 n4.
RId. at 67. The warning was distributed directly to patients in the fonn of a label
on the pill dispenser. See id. at 66-67 & nn.3-4. Preserved for the moment is the question
of how, even accepting the court's abrogation of the learned intermediary rule, the
adequacy of this relatively exhaustive warning was allowed to go to a jury. See
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 303 (noting the courts' "overwhelming temptation
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The MacDonald court noted Massachusetts precedent embracing the
principles underlying the learned intermediary rule." While recognizing
the learned intermediary rule as being applicable "in jurisdictions that
have addressed the question of the extent of a manufacturer's duty to
warn in cases involving prescription drugs,"' the court did not explicitly
adopt the rule. Instead, the court simply concluded that "[o]ral contracep-
tives ... bear peculiar characteristics which warrant the imposition of a
common law duty on the manufacturer to warn users directly of
associated risks. 5
The MacDonald court then identified the justification for imposing
on the manufacturer a duty to warn the consumer directly in oral
contraceptive situations. The first, and seemingly most important, factor
was the patient's typically increased decision-making role in obtaining a
prescription for "the pill."
Whereas a patient's involvement in decision-making concerning the use
of a prescription drug necessary to treat a malady is typically minimal
or nonexistent, the healthy, young consumer of oral contraceptives is
usually actively involved in the decision to use "the pill," as opposed to
other available birth control products, and the prescribing physician is
relegated to a relatively passive role.'
This justification might be viewed as encompassing three factors.
First is the principal one noted by the court-that the patient generally
initiates the consideration of oral contraceptives. Second is the corre-
spondingly diminished role of the physician whose patient specifically
... to view a claim as prima facie valid and thus to allow the jury to decide, putting off
to another day and another place the uncomfortable task of 'getting tough' with
plaintiff).
'3 MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 68 (citing Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693
(Mass. 1946), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TogRS § 388 cant. n (1965)). The
MacDonald court stated:
In such narrowly defined circumstances, the manufacturer's irmunmity fraom
liability if the consumer does not receive the warning is explicable on the
grounds that the intermediary's failure to warn is a superseding cause of the
consumer's injury, or, alternatively, that, because it is unreasonable in such
circunstances to expect the manufacturer to communicate with the consumer,
the manufacturer has no duty directly to warn the consumer.
Id. (citation omitted).





requests a particular drug. Third is the notion that the use of oral
contraceptives constitutes an elective course of treatment, as indicated by
the court's description of pill users as "healthy, young" individuals.'
The MacDonald court next examined the standard practice of
prescribing and renewing prescriptions for oral contraceptives based on
annual examinations.
[The physician prescribing "the pill," as a matter of course, examines
the patient once before prescribing an oral contraceptive and only
annually thereafter. ... Thus, the patient may only seldom have the
opportunity to explore her questions and concerns about the medication
with the prescribing physician. Even if the physician, on those occa-
sions, were scrupulously to remind the patient of the risks attendant on
continuation of the oral contraceptive, "the patient cannot be expected
to remember all of the details for a protracted period of time."98
Once again, the court's reasoning on this point encompasses a number
of interrelated factors. To begin with, the indefinite duration of the
treatment is readily distinguishable from conventional prescription
products. Related to the durational aspect is the lowered monitoring
function served by the physician once the medication is prescribed."
Finally, the court's concern that the typical patient could not remember
the information for extended periods of time hints at the relative
complexity of the warning information provided."®
The court then pointed to the "extensive Federal regulation ' "' of
oral contraceptives undertaken by the Food and Drug Administration
('FDA"), noting in particular agency findings that oral contraceptives
were generally taken electively and entailed a "'relatively high incidence
of serious illness.""' Other FDA findings that the court relied upon
supported the court's earlier conclusions that the information was too
complex to be effectively disseminated orally and that absent written
7 Id.
-Id. (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 9002 (1970) (requiring that a booklet containing fall
disclosure of risks be made available to the doctor for dissemination to the patient and
that the dispensing package alert the patient of the advisability of a doctor-patient
discussion of the use of the drugs)).
9 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 69-70 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 4215 (1978) (requiring that labels war of the
risks of blood clots, ciculatory problems, cancer and the effects on unbom children




warnings directed to the patients, "many potential users of 'the pill" 10 3
would be inadequately informed.
The MacDonald court concluded that manufacturers of oral contra-
ceptives have a duty "to provide the consumer written warnings
conveying reasonable notice" 0" of the risks attendant with the use of
birth control pills."05 The court specifically rejected the defendant's
contention that its compliance with FDA labeling requirements served to
"preempt or define the bounds of the common law duty to warn," 0
leaving to the jury the decision of whether the warning given had been
adequate.
107
The only other court to recognize the rule announced in MacDonald
is the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
In two 1985 decisions, the court ruled that Michigan law required the
manufacturer of a prescription drug to warn users of oral contraceptives
directly.' Both cases were decided after the Michigan Supreme Court
announced, in response to certified questions, that it was "not prepared
. . . to state a rule of law regarding the duty of prescription drug
manufacturers that depends on some other person providing warn-
ings."' 9 The Michigan Supreme Court thus not only declined to decide
whether Michigan law provided for an oral contraceptive exception to the
learned intermediary rule, but refused to determine whether the rule itself
was the law in Michigan. The Michigan Supreme Court also dismissed
as dictum an earlier decision purporting to recognize the learned
intermediary rule and similar decisions of the intermediate appellate
courts.
°10
Forced to decide the issue on its own, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan, in Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
"1id. at 70 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 9002 (1970) (requiring that a fill disclosure
booklet be made available to the doctor for dissemination to the patient)).
10 Id. at 70-71.
MacDonald is interesting not only because it recognized a manufacturer's duty to
warn patients directly, but also because it acknowledged that manufacturers were already




.0 Odgers v. Ortho Pharnaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(holding that contraceptive manufacturer has duty to warn user directly of possible side
effects); Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding
that contraceptive manufacturer has duty to warn user directly of side effects when
prescribed for contraceptive purposes).
109 In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873, 877-78 (Mich. 1984).
no Id. at 877.
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adopted the reasoning set forth by the dissent in In re Certified Questions
and recognized an exception to the learned intermediary rule for oral
contraceptives."' Consequently, the In re Certified Questions dissent
warrants discussion.
The dissent in In re Certified Questions would have adopted the
learned intermediary rule as applied to therapeutic drugs. The dissent
would have based this result on the rationale that patients rely "almost
completely"" on their physicians in deciding whether to take such
drugs. In addition, the dissent expressed concern that any other rule
would interfere with the doctor-patient relationship."' However, the
dissent distinguished common prescription practice in the oral contracep-
tive context from that employed with more common drugs, noting that
"[tihe focus with oral contraceptives is patient choice.... The physician
makes no assessment of medical need."114 In noting the pervasive
"marketing and resultant widespread use of oral contraceptives," 5 the
In re Certified Questions dissent indicated abelief that the manufacturers'
marketing efforts increased consumer demand in a manner uncommon in
the prescription drug field and thus warranted a requirement that
manufacturers warn consumers directly."' The dissent bolstered its
conclusion with evidence that two-thirds of the women who had taken
oral contraceptives before the FDA required manufacturers to provide
warnings directly to patients "had never been warned of possible hazards
by their physicians. ' 7 In this regard, the dissent quoted a statement
issued by the American Medical Association ("AMA") explaining the
medical profession's position on oral contraceptives as follows: "The
medical profession regards the pill, in most cases, as a convenience,
rather than a traditional medication and hence the patient must bear her
share [of] the legal and moral responsibility for taking it.""
8
.. Stephens, 602 F. Supp. at 380-81 (discussing In re Certhfied Questions, 358
N.W.2d at 878-87 (Boyle, J., dissenting)).-
"2 In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d at 883.
" Id. ("A warning to the patient under these circumstances could potentially ...
cause patient confusion, and result in a hampering of the healing process.").
"1 Id. at 884 (citation omitted).
... Id. at 884-85.
116 Id.
1
7 Id. at 885 (citing Poll on the Pill-18 Percent of U.S. Users Have Recently Quit,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 1970, in Hearings on Present Status Competition in the Phannacui-
cal Industry Before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Senate Committee on Small
Business, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 16, p. 6628 (1970)).
118 Id. (quoting SCIENCE NEWS, Mar. 14, 1970, quoted in Note, Liability of Birth
Control Pill Manufacturers, 23 HASTINGS LJ. 1526, 1532 (1972)).
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The In re Certfied Questions dissent refuted assertions that their
holding would interfere with the physician-patient relationship and would
impose an impossible duty on manufacturers. In rejecting the interference
argument, the dissent relied on the special circumstances outlined above
regarding prescription practice in the case of oral contraceptives."' As
for the impossibility argument, the dissent noted existing FDA require-
ments as conclusive evidence against the assertion that providing
warnings to consumers would be impossible. 2 Finally, the dissent
rejected the argument that allowing a state tort action would "pose[
unacceptable problems of federal-state conflict, ' by noting language
indicating that the FDA had not intended such preemption when it
promulgated the regulation requiring manufacturers of oral contraceptives
to provide warnings directly to the consumer.'
The district court in Stephens adopted the In re Certified Questions
dissent without extensive discussion.' This paucity of discussion was
noted in the case of Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,' decided
by the same Michigan district court later the same year. The Odgers court
therefore undertook a more thorough review of the law before agreeing
that the Michigan Supreme Court would impose upon "a manufacturer of
oral contraceptives ... a duty to warn users of its products for birth
1 9 Id.
" Id. at 885-86 (citation onitted). The dissent was carefd to point out, however, that
its reliance on the FDA provisions was solely for the purpose of refuting the maumfacu-
er s argument regarding feasibility; the dissent's assertion that direct warnings to
consumers should be required in the case of oral contraceptives did "not rest on the
existence of an FDA requirement to do so." Id. at 886 n.15. Compare with this holding
that of Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmacutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961, modified, 532 F.
Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981), in which a negligence per so cause of action was allowed
to proceed based on the violation of federal labeling requirements. See infra notes 133-38,
234-40 and accompanying text.
m In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d at 886.
Id. at 886 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 4214 (1978)).
See Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379, 380.81 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
2 609 F. Supp. 867, 875 (E.D. Mich 1985) ("Aside from describing the dissent as
'vigorous and intelligent', the court, however, failed to clearly articulate its reasons for
concluding that should the Michigan Supreme Court be faced again with the question the
majority would adopt the dissent's position."). Actually, the Odgers court's analysis is
somewhat misleading, since the Michigan Supreme Court's refusal to rule on the issue
was due in large part to its perception that a concrete controversy was not before it. See
In re Certified Questions, 358 N.W.2d at 874 ("We believe that the Legislature is in a
better position to allocate those duties. If, because of legislative inaction, this Court is
constrained to make the choices necessary for deciding this question, it would be better
to do so in a case where the factual record is fully developed .... ").
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control purposes directly of any risks inherent in their use."'' n The
Odgers court first summarized the justifications for the direct-warning
requirement that the MacDonald and Stephens courts had accepted and
that the In re Certified Questions dissent had proffered.
[The justifications for a direct-warning requirement include:] use
attributed to consumer demand rather than physician's advice, use for
extended periods without medical assessment, and FDA regulations
requiring direct warnings to patients. In addition, the dissent and the
court in Stephens found that consumers of oral contraceptives are
subjected to much laudatory publicity attributable to the manufacturers
and aimed directly at consumers.
126
The Odgers court placed no reliance on the marketing justification,
due in part to the defendant's claims that such a justification was
unsupported save for citation to a single law journal note.' The court
considered the defendant's assertion that, because some contraceptive
prescriptions were for legitimately therapeutic purposes, the risk of
interference with the physician-patient relationship was more severe than
previously estimated in earlier cases. The court found this threat
outweighed, however, by the need for direct warnings to users.' In
addition, the assertion that the FDA requirements in effect preempted the
imposition of state tort liability was once again rejected."
One element considered in somewhat greater detail by the Odgers
court was the idea that part of the rationale behind the learned intermedi-
ary rule is the notion that, in some cases, patients should not be warned
directly because they might overestimate the risk and refuse treatment that
they should accept." This rationale was found inapplicable, since
125 Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 879.
'2' Id. at 875 (citations omitted). Ofnoteworthy significance is the language at the end
of the quoted passage indicating that the manufacturer's extensive promotion of the
product was a factor in the decision to require a direct manufacturer-to-patient wamin&
See infra notes 143-54 and accompanying text (discussing "over-promotion" as basis for
discarding learned intermediary rule).
2 Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 876 (citing Note, Liability of Birth Control Pill
Manufacturers, 33 HASTINGS L.' 1526 (1972)).
1' Id. at 876-77.
129 Id. at 877-78.
'
30 Id. at 878. Another justification sometimes given for the actual withholding of
information from the patient is the so-called "therapeutic privilege." See supra cases cited
notes 59 & 113. See generally Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 655-56, 686-87 (discussing
the "therapeutic privilege" that allows physicians to withhold information from a patient
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"rejection of an oral contraceptive for purposes of birth control ... is not
life threatening. '131 Similarly, as in Stephens, the Odgers court referred
to the FDA requirements already in place in rejecting the assertion that
directly warning consumers was prohibitively difficult. The court also
refuted the assertion that the FDA requirements effectively mandated the
substantive content of the warning."
One final case that warrants consideration in this context is
Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,33 which preceded but has
been said to have anticipated the 1985 Michigan and Massachusetts
cases." In Lukaszewicz, the court accepted a negligence per se theory
based on the defendant company's violation of FDA regulations requiring
direct written warnings to consumers.'35 As one commentator has noted,
however, the Lukaszewicz court's reliance on the violation of universally
followed warning requirements renders its current significance highly
questionable." Perhaps more importantly, Lukaszewicz is not so much
an exception to the learned intermediary rule as it is a determination that
particular federal regulations should form the basis for a state tort law
action.37 Nonetheless, the case did formulate a duty on the part of oral
contraceptive manufacturers to warn patients directly. Moreover,
Lukaszewcz might, in fact, represent a better balancing of interests than
that reached in the 1985 cases due to its reliance on objectively ascertain-
able standards of which the manufacturer was aware prior to commence-
ment of litigation."
The oral contraceptive exception to the learned intermediary rule has
not been widely accepted by other courts39 and has been the target of
criticism from numerous commentators."~ Nonetheless, the exception
when the information is not in the patient's best interests).
,3 Odgers, 609 F. Supp. at 878.
w Id. at 878-79 (citation omitted).
Lu 510 F. Supp. 961, rodfled, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
" See Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 649 n.82.
"4 Lukaszewicz, 510 F. Supp. at 963-64 (citation omitted).
" See Flannagan, supra note 39, at 416-17 (stating that under Lukaszewiz, "the
manufacturer need only comply with the regulations to fulfill its duty to warn the
consumer directly").
137 See id. at 417 (stating that the Lukaszewicz court merely utilized an altenative
theory of recovery-violation of a federal regulation).
", See infra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
"3 See MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.D.C. 1991) ('qhe
dissent to the MacDonald decision noted that 'no other court has embraced the rule laid
down today by the court,' ... and that observation appears to remain true today."
(citations omitted)).
'4' See, e.g., Gilhooley, sipra note 13, at 651 ("Although there are some important
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definitely survives in Massachusetts and, possibly, in Michigan.4
Hopeful plaintiffs will no doubt continue to extol the reasoning applied
in those few cases in hopes of imposing liability on the manufacturers of
prescription drugs. Moreover, the reasoning applied in those cases
recognizing the oral contraceptive exception has been influential in other
contexts 42 and is thus of continuing significance.
C. Over-Promotion
According to the "over-promotion" or "advertising" exception to the
learned intermediary rule, a prescription drug manufacturer might, in
effect, assume a duty to warn consumers directly if the manufacturer's
efforts to market its product to the consumer are viewed as excessive.""
differences between therapeutic drugs and elective drugs, in the end these differences do
not seem as important as the similarities among prescription drugs."); McKenna, supra
note 61, at 960 & 960 n.76 (citing Fern, supra note 12, at 15-18, and Flannagan, supra
note 39, at 419-20); Flannagan, supra note 39, at 420 (noting that "[i]t is possible that the
MacDonald standard imposes an 'absolute liability' which could inevitably prompt oral
contraceptive menufacturem to withdraw their product from the market").
141 Michigan law on the subject is unclear. While the Michigan Supreme Court has
been silent on the issue since it refused to resolve the conflict in In re Certified
Questions, 358 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1984), a judge in the same federal district court in
wich Stephens and Odgers were decided has ruled that Michigan law encompasses the
learned intermediary rule and makes no exception for oral contraceptives. Reaves v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (E.D. Mich. 1991). See also Spychala V.
G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1032 & n.5 (D.N.J. 1988) (stating that "the
Michigan cases are of questionable precedential value" based on the existence of a Sixth
Circuit decision applying the learned intermediary rule and a Michigan Court of Appeals
decision applying the rule in a case involving contraceptives (citing Beyette v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 823 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1987) and Mowery v. Crittenton Hosp.,
400 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. App. 1986))).
14 See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 n.11, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing an exception to the learned intermediary rule for IUDs) (citing Odgers v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985) and MacDonald v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.) (recognizing an exception to the
learned intermediary rule for oral contraceptives), cert denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985)). See
infra notes 170-200 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., Hill, 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (recognizing exception to learned intermediary
rule in IUD case based, in part, on the fact that the manufacturer 'Imarketed the product
with the idea of convincing women to choose" to use it); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764
F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass. 1991) ("In an appropriate case, the advertising of a
prescription drug to the consuming public may constitute a third exception to the learned
interediary rule [, the other two being vaccines and, in some jurisdictions, oral
contraceptives]. By advertising directly to the consuming public the manufacturer
bypasses the traditional patient-physician relationship, thus lessening the role of the
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Earlier cases involving intensive marketing efforts directed toward the
medical community provide support for such a policy requiring direct
mantacturer-to-patient warnings because of manufacturer over-promo-
tion. "
The court in Love v. Woff laid the foundation for the principle
that a manufacturer's warnings could be diluted by excessive promotion
efforts that caused physicians to overlook the warning information given
to them.'" The Love court determined that a genuine issue of material
fact existed regarding whether the manufacturer had "watered down its
regulatory-mandated warnings and had caused its detail men to promote
a wider use of the drug by physicians than proper medical practice
justified."1 7 The court's discussion of the intensive marketing efforts of
the drug manufacturer, and the resulting conclusion that these efforts had
diluted the effectiveness of the warnings given, could be relied upon in
the somewhat analogous context of bypassing the learned intermediary
rule in cases involving excessive promotional efforts of drug manufactur-
ers.
1"
'learned intermediary'."), rev'd on other ground, 976 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992).
'44 Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 348 S.E.2d 772, 777 (N.C. 1986) (stating that
"the failure of medical personnel to timely recognize and treat such condition [if due to
overpromotion] ... would establish the essential element of proximate cause in plaintiff's
negligence action"); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1238 (11. App. Ct.
1979) (stating that "the jury was entitled to consider [evidence of overpromotion] in
arriving at a decision as to the adequacy of the warnings!).
145 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (CL App. 1964). Love also recognized the doctrine that became
the learned intennediary rule. Id. at 192 ("Parke-Davis has no contact with the ultimate
consumer of the drug, the patient. The duty, therefore, whatever its extent may be, must
be a duty to wain the doctor who prescribes the drug.").
146 Id at 193.
'4 Id. at 197. The drug involved in Love, Chloromycetin, was over-promoted despite
evidence of its unreasonable dangers. See Sage, supra note 12, at 1018 n.118 which
stated-
Despite conclusive evidence of the drug's danger and the fact that it was
superior to other antibiotics in only a handful of emergencies, Parke-Davis
downplayed the drug's toxicity so effectively that ten years after the discovery
of its adverse effects, Chloromycetin was being prescribed wrongly in about
90% of cases, including for acne and the common cold.
(citing MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILP R. LEE, PILLs, PRoprrs AND PoLTcs 59-61, 283-
88 (1974)). Q. id. at 1017 ("Drug companies spend nearly as much money on promotion
as American medical schools spend on all their educational activities." (citation omitted)).
'41 Love, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 193 ("[E]ven conceding a proper warning had been given
Dr. Wolf and the rest of the medical profession, such warnings must be deemed cancelled




The theme in Love is evident in other oral contraceptive cases, insofar
as those cases consider consumer demand as a result of advertising to be
a factor in creating an exception to the learned intermediary rule. 49 In
Love, the result was that an otherwise adequate warning was found to
have been so diluted by promotion as to be rendered inadequate." In
the oral contraceptive or other prescription drug context, it might be
similarly found that a manufacturer can assume a duty to warn consumers
directly when the manufacturer, through marketing' activities directed
toward the consumer, in effect "bypasses the traditional patient-physician
relationship""' and thus causes exceptional consumer demand." The
effect of over-promotion is quite similar to that observed in the oral
contraceptive context in that patients are presumed to play a greater role
in seeking out and deciding to take the medication, while doctors are
uncharacteristically excluded from the decision-making process.
The over-promotion basis for creating an exception to the learned
intermediary rule was recently invoked in Hill v. Searle Laboratories!'
In Hill, an IUD manufacturer was found to have marketed its product
directly to the consumer, thus increasing demand for the product and
diminishing the physician's relative role in the decision-making pro-
cess." 4 Hill thus represents the continuing evolution of the learned
intermediary rule and, particularly, the potential impact that marketing
efforts can have on manufacturer liability for failure to warn.
D. The Head-On Challenges
The discussion of exceptions to the learned intermediary rule has thus
far focused on limited exceptions based on particular applications of the
rule. Courts have generally limited the exceptions to fact-specific
situations; even Massachusetts and Michigan retain the learned intermedi-
ary rule outside the oral contraceptive context." However, some
commentators have called for total abrogation of the rule and posit a
number of justifications for doing so.
Si' ee supra notes 116, 126-27 and accompanying text.
"0 Love, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 208, 211 n.4 (D. Mass. 1991), rev'don
other grounds, 976 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1992).
'Id.
"'884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 1071.
155 See, e.g., Garside, 764 F. Supp. 208 (D. Mass. 1991) (applying learned
intermediary rule under Massachusetts law), rev'don other grounds, 976 F.2d 77 (1st Cir.
1992); Mowery v. Crittenton Hosp., 400 N.W.2d 633 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
under Michigan law a manufacturer has no duty to warn consumer directly).
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The most serious justification for abrogation of the learned
intermediary rule is the assertion that the learned intermediary rule is
based on an erroneous assumption that doctors are equipped to provide
adequate warnings to consumers. In this regard, some commentators
maintain that doctors are woefully unprepared to provide adequate
warnings to consumers." Putting warning material directly into the
hands of patients would supplement warnings provided by the overloaded
physician and facilitate a more focused consideration of the warning
information by the patient, who does not have the distraction of warnings
concerning myriad other drugs. As one commentator put it, "the patient
is not concerned with knowing the risks of a broad spectrum of drugs, but
only of the risks of the drug prescribed.""'
Another challenge to the learned intermediary rule is based on the
right of a patient to be fully informed of the risks of any drug she
takes." In this regard Margaret Gilhooley points to the changing face
of the informed consent doctrine, which has been moving away from
what she considers a paternalistic standard and toward a greater emphasis
on patient autonomy, as ajustification for the rule's abrogation. Gilhooley
thus suggests that the learned intermediary rule is a remnant of the days
when patients were expected to follow doctors' orders without question,
and argues that the learned intermediary rule should be replaced by a
requirement that manufacturers of prescription drugs warn consumers
"3 See, e.g., Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 670 ("Recent developments have shown,
however, that [the assertion that physicians will adequately inform patients] is sus-
pect-there are serious drawbacks in relying solely on the physician to provide risk
information to patients orally.); Sage, supra note 12, at 1001 ('ndeed, there is
overwhelming evidence that physicians work with inadequate information [regarding drug
risks], a problem that manufacturers alone cannot remedy:' (citation omitted)); Donald
E. Thompson II, The Drug Manufacturer's Duty to Warn-To Whom Does It Extend?, 13
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 135, 143 (1985) ('The doctrine substantially overstates the ability
and willingness of the medical community to act as a 'learned intermediary,' impedes the
right of the patient to knowledge of the substances which he places in his body, and
ignores the substantial benefits derived from having an informed patient"); id. at 145
("[In light of the constant bombardment with large volumes of rapidly changing drug
literature, the physician is 'unable to keep up with this ever-changing sea of knowledge."'
(citation omitted)).
Of course, these commentators assume that doctors are supposed to pass warnings
along to consumers, as opposed to simply deciding for the patient which drugs are
appropriate. See supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text (discussing different theories
of the physician's role in the intermediary context).
15 Thompson, supra note 156, at 145.
Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 654-55.
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directly."5 In essence, this challenge to the learned intermediary rule
states that patients should have full information and decide for themselves
what goes into their bodies.
Apart from the issue of what a patient ought to know in order to
decide whether or not to ingest a drug is the issue of what a patient needs
to know in order to use a drug safely and to monitor its effects. Critics
of the learned intermediary rule who assert safety concerns as ajustifica-
tion for abandoning the rule generally assume, reasonably enough, that
manufacturers who are left open to liability will provide warning
information directly to patients."6 Such commentators contend that
patients who are better informed can recognize danger signs and thus
ensure proper use of medications.' The goal sought by these writers
is greater patient information, which would presumably result in more
informed patients who are better able to safely use drug products;' the
means to the end is manufacturer liability for failure to warn.
Finally, many commentators have made attempts to attack the learned
intermediary rule on economic grounds. Some of these commentators
contend that the learned intermediary rule removes any economic
incentive a manufacturer might have to ensure that patients are adequately
warned.63 Commentators also point to the inefficiency of burdening
physicians with the responsibility of ensuring that adequate warnings are
given.'" One writer, anticipating challenges to mandatory patient inserts
1" Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 653-58, 673-74; see also Thompson, supra note 156,
at 146 ("Undoubtedly, the single most important reason for imposing upon the
manufacturer of prescription drugs the duty to warn consumers of possible side effects is
the notion of informed consent".
" Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 672-73; Thompson, supra note 156, at 150-53. But
see infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text (arguing that prescription drug manufactur-
er liability might, in fhct, leave manufacturers unable to meet unrealistic duties to warn
and force many to exit the market altogether). Commentators also tend to assume that
manufacturer liability would lead to written warnings to patients from the manufacturers,
which would be in addition to the oral warnings received from the physiciin. The
advantages of written warnings are thus incorporated into the gains to be expected if the
learned intermediary rule were abolished. See Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 672-73;
Thompson, supra note 156, at 151.
See Thompson, supra note 156, at 150.
x See Gilhooley, supra note 13, at 672-73; Thompson, supra note 156, at 150.
'o See McGarey, supra note 51, at 140 ("From an economic standpoint, there is no
reason to provide consumers with information where no liability is imposed. Additionally,
judicial language suggesting that consumer-direct labeling is not effective to communicate
warnings to consumers further dampens manufacturer incentive to provide such
information.").
'" See id. at 144.
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on cost grounds, cited surveys indicating consumer willingness to pay a
few cents extra per prescription in exchange for written warning
information.
65
The above-cited commentators raise a number of valid points and
clearly establish imperfections in the learned intermediary rule. The fact
remains, however, that the rule is virtually universally accepted by courts
and is subject to only a few limited exceptions. Nonetheless, the issue of
whether those exceptions should be expanded, or indeed whether the rule
itself should be discarded, is far from settled. Moreover, it is clear that
the learned intermediary rule will play an increasingly important role in
pending and ongoing litigation concerning breast implants, IUDs and
other medical devices.
IV. DEVICE CASES: A NEW SHAPE FOR THE DocTRINE?
The learned intermediary rule was developed in the context of
prescription drugs, but the policies behind the rule have led many courts
to extend the rule's application to medical device cases.'" However,
this application is by no means universal, and some courts have indicated
a variety of factors that will be considered in deciding whether to apply
'65 Thompson, sipra note 156, at 152 n.96 ("A survey of certain television viewers
found that 69% of the noon and 57% of the evening viewers said they were willing to pay
an additional thirty cents per prescription to receive patient package inserts. Of those not
willing to pay thirty cents, 69% of the noon and 64% of the evening viewers were willing
to pay an additional ten cents." (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754, 60,759 (1980))). See also
(ilhooley, supra note 13, at 679 ("[P]atients have expressed a willingness to pay more
for the benefits that they perceive will be derived from patient labeling than the FDA has
estimated the labeling might actually cost them." (citation omitted)); McGarey, supra note
51, at 147-48 (Patient package inserts "would add only 1.5 cents to the cost of a
prescription [and] ... the average cost of a prescription [is] $11.20:' (citations omitted)).
' See, e.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1993)
(accepting the arguinent that under the learned intennediary rule, heart valve manufactur-
er's"duty to warn, if any, was to give information to [the treating physician] as a 'learned
intermediazy"); Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296, 303 (7th Cir. 1987)
(finding "no principled basis" on which to distinguish prescription drugs fiom medical
devices); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1514-18 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(applying the learned inteimediary rule in IUD case without distinguishing prescription
drugs from medical devices); Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D.
Md. 1989) (holding that under the learned intermediary rule, the manfcturer's duty to
warn of risks of rupture of breast prosthesis was satisfied by warning the physician);
Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 231 Cal. Rptr. 396, 399 (1986) (IUD case holding
that products-drugs and devices-ere to be treated alike); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662
P.2d 646, 650 (N.M. Ct. App.) (mammary prosthesis case finding that the manufacture's
duty was to warn the physician, not the patient), cert denied, 662 P.2d 645 (N.M. 1983).
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the learned intermediary rule in medical device cases.'" The current
wave of high-profile cases involving controversial devices such as IUDs
and breast implants will test the appropriateness of the rule's application
in device cases and will perhaps prompt a reexamination of the rule itself
For these reasons, this portion of the Note considers the viability of the
learned intermediary rule in medical device cases generally, with
emphasis on -recent cases involving IUDs and breast implants,1" and
' See Hill v. Searle Lab., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that IUD
manufacturer must warn patients directly, based on diminished role of physician in
decision-making process).
" This discussion is undertaken despite the possibility that failure-to-warn claims
involving medical devices might eventually be deemed to be preempted by federal
regulations. See Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989)
(holding that Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
worked to preempt failure-to-warn "claims based on breast implants received after
Amendments' effective date). The law remains unclear as to whether failure-to-warn
claims involving breast implants, IUDs and other medical devices will be preempted by
section 360K(a) of the Amendments, which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1988). In IUD cases, a number of factors may bear on whether or
not preemption bars state failure-to-warn claims. To date, Desmarais is the only breast
implant case finding preemption, and its preemption holding was not necessary to the case
because the plaintiff in Desmarais received her implants prior to the Amendments'
effective date. Desmarais, 712 F. Supp. at 15. A more recent decision allowed a claim
involving implants received afer the Amendments took effect to proceed without
reference to the preemption issue. Toole v. McClintock, 778 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Ala.
1991). Thus, the status of preemption remains unclear. However, preemption may
eventually provide the best balance for resolving failure-to-warn claims in the prescription
drug and device context See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
While the preemption issue is beyond the scope of this Note, suffice it to say that
the law remains unclear, and the learned intermediary rule's viability continues in device
cases. Moreover, the rule might still have a role even if preemption is conclusively
established. As previously indicated, the learned intermediary rule does not involve the
adequacy or forn of warnings, but only concerns the issue of to whom warnings must be
given. See supra text following note 38. Thus, even if federal warning and labeling
requirements set the standard of what warnings might be given, it is still conceivable that
state law, via judicial decision, could require direct manufacturer-to-patient warnings and
thereby, at least tangentially, broach the issue of the learned inteninedimay rule. The
Lukaszewicz case, which allowed a negligence per so claim based on failure to comply
with federal labeling regulations, see supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text, is
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reevaluates in this context the benefits of the learned intermediary rule in
general.
A. IUDs
Thus far, courts have almost unanimously applied the learned
intermediary rule in IUD cases. 9 The one glaring exception is the case
of Hill v. Searle Laboratories.70 Likening IUDs to birth control pills,
the Hill court refused to apply the learned intermediary rule to such
devices and held that the manufacturer of an IUD must warn consumers
directly.17 Because the comprehensive challenge to the learned interme-
diary rule which prevailed in Hill could serve as a model for future
challenges to the rule, a closer look at the Hill decision is warranted.
The Hill decision reflects an analysis of the two primary justifications
for the learned intermediary rule and the specific exceptions to the rule
that courts have recognized. Relying on both the oral contraceptive
exceptioni' and the mass immunization exception, 73 the Hill court
determined that the learned intermediary doctrine was inapplicable to
manufacturers of IUDs:
representative of this continued possibility. Such state actions would seemingly not entail
differe4 or even additional, requirements but would instead simply allow a state action
based on failure to meet federal requirements. In any event, consideration of the learned
intennedimy rule in device cases provides a useful testing ground for the learned
intermediary rule's continued viability generally.
" See, e.g., Odom v. G.D. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1992) (Cu-7 IUD);
Beyette v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 823 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1987) (Lippes Loop IUD);
Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cu-7 IUD); Kociemba
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988) (Cii-7 IUD); McKee v. Moore,
648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982) (Lippes Loop IUD). It should be noted that the Cu-7 IUD is
classified as a prescription drug and thus is not really an extension of the learned
intermediary rule to device cases. On the other hand, this fact may make the decision in
Hill v. Searle Laboratories to except the Cu-7 IUD from the learned intermediary rule,
see infra notes 170-200 and accompanying text, a somewhat more significant deviation
from common practice than if the case had involved a device that was not classified as
a drug. In any event, the distinction of drug from device should not be controlling: the
recipient of a medical device, just hke the recipient of a prescription for medication, "is
expected to and, it can be presumed, does place primary reliance upon" the physician in
deciding whether to consent to the treatment Terhne v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975,
978 (Wash. 1978) (Dalkon Shield). Indeed, the court in Terhn=e found no legitimate basis
on which to distinguish "devices such as the Dalkon Shield' from prescription drugs. Id.
'7' 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989).
171 Id. at 1071.
' See sqra notes 88-142 and accompanying text
17 See suqra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
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Recognizing that these factors limit the role that a physician plays in
determining the necessity and desirability of birth control, and the fact
that physicians are inundated with information about various prescription
drug products, we think that in the case of IUDs, prescribing physicians
do not make an individualized medical judgment. Thus, Hill's treating
physician was not an intervening party between herself and Searle. It
was feasible to warn Hill. Moreover, such warning was required by
FDA regulation. Therefore, the trial court erred in applying the learned
intermediary rule to the facts of this case. 4
In carving out an IUD exception, the Hill court, in effect, employed
virtually every factor that has heretofore been applied or asserted to
justify exceptions to the learned intermediary rule. The primary reason for
creating an IUD exception was the court's impression that the patient's
increased role in the decision-making process, and the doctor's uncharac-
teristically "limited input! "' into the making of that decision, readily
distinguish the use of an IUD from use of typical prescription drugs. 6
In concluding that a patient-doctor role reversal had occurred in the IUD
context, the court "shotgunned" a number of individual factors into the
balance, all within one paragraph and with little or no explanation of how
each factor was particularly significant in the context of IUDs as opposed
to other drugs. The following discussion considers these factors indepen-
dently in order to determine their collective worth.
1. Patient Choice
The Hill court, like other courts recognizing an exception for oral
contraceptives,'" placed great weight on the fact that patients them-
selves seek out IUDs from their physicians, thereby diminishing the
typically exclusive control that physicians exercise over treatment
selection'" While this characterization might reflect common practice,
the physician's role in selecting a general course of treatment4 such as
intrauterine birth control, is in reality only a small part of the justification
for the learned intermediary rule. More important is the physician's expert
knowledge of the treatment and the product, and his or her ability to
match a given treatment with a given patient according to the characteris-
174 Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071 (citations omitted).
175 Id.
176 Id.
' See supra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
171 Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071.
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tics of both. The mere fact that a patient walks into the doctor's office
and mouths the letters "IUD" hardly relieves the physician of his or her
duty to independently gauge the benefits and costs of that patient's use of
an IUD and to obtain the patient's informed consent prior to agreeing to
perform the operation or prescribe the product.
2. The Patient's Retention of "Final Choice"
in Deciding on a Method of Contraception
The Hill opinion also stresses the fact that "the final choice" among
methods of birth control "remains that of the woman."'7 This assertion,
like the focus on patient initiative in seeking out treatment, assumes that
physicians play no meaningful role in the decision-making process. More
importantly, however, the assertion implies that the final choice in other
treatment contexts rests with someone other than the patient. This is
simply not the case. Whether the prescription is for penicillin or triple
bypass surgery, the patient always retains final authority to determine
what is done to, or ingested by, his or her body."s The physician is
relied upon to assist in making that determination, and patients inevitably
vary as to the extent to which they will rely on the physician's advice.
Nonetheless, in the vast majority of treatment contexts, the patient, in the
end, makes the decision.
3. The Decreased Level of Physician Supervision
or Monitoring After the Insertion of the IUD
The Hill court also noted that the patient in the case at bar had no contact
with her prescribing physician "for over two years after receiving the
[IUD]"'' The court apparently viewed this scenario as typical, without
further documentation, and implied that the lack of physician monitoring
justified requiring manufactu -to-patient wamings.'1 Assuming that such
long-term monitoring is necessary due to the long-term use of IUDs, it
remains open to question how manufacturer-to-patient warnings are more
effective than physician-to-patient warnings in the case of long-term
treatments.
17 Hd
10 C. Terlume v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978) ('There is, for
example, a patient's choice between continuing to endure a physical ailment or submitting
to surgery or some other course of treatment ... :1.




Obviously, if the manufacturer provides written inserts, the patient
will be better able to refresh his or her knowledge of the warnings over
a long period of time.I" This advantage is somewhat dubious, however,
in the case of an IUD. The nature of the risks associated with IUDs are
such that a patient should ideally weigh them fully before having the
device installed; once the IUD is inserted, the danger has been accepted,
and the treatment requires no further action. Compare this with oral
contraceptives, which because they generally are taken daily entail a
recurring and deliberate exposure to danger by the patient, and thus make
a better case for repetitive warnings. The advantage of written inserts
accompanying IUDs must therefore be attributed primarily to the need for
patient self-monitoring in the absence of regular physician supervision.
Certainly, written warnings in this context could conceivably fill any gap
left by a perceived lack of physician monitoring.
What is not clear is why an asserted need for written warnings
necessitates manufacturer-to-patient warning. Obviously, the manufacturer
has greater access to the distribution network and is generally in a better
position both.to produce and distribute written warnings. But if the void
that creates the need for written warnings is due to the physician's failure
to monitor, shifting the duty to the manufacturer, while also expanding
the duty to entail written warnings, is not an altogether satisfactory
remedy.
4. The Manufacturer's Efforts to Market the Product
The Hill court suggested that the manufacturer's marketing efforts
warranted a deviation from the learned intermediary rule.1" The notion
that "over-promotion' might justify an exception to the learned intermedi-
ary rule can be traced to relatively established doctrine, 8s and one can
imagine cases in which advertising is so pervasive as to compel an
exception to the learned intermediary rule. However, factual findings of
this sort were not made by the court in Hill, which stated only that
" The asserted need for written warnings has formed the basis of several articles
calling for the abolition of the learned intermediary rule. See, e.g., Gilhooley, s"Pa note
13, at 672-75 (detailing the reasons why increased patient information promotes tort
objectives); McGarey, supra note 51, at "138-41 (arguing that direct written warnings to
the patient provide better protection than is provided under the learned intermediary rule).
15 Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071.
1.. See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text (discussing the over-promotion
exception to learned intermediary rule). The issue of drug manufacturer advertising and
its impact on liability is an interesting topic worthy of greater consideration than the
cursory treatment it receives in this Note and in Hill.
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"Searle marketed the product with the idea of convincing women to
choose the CU-7 [IUD]."' Thus, the Hill decision provides no
indication of the types or extent of advertising or marketing activities that
may cause a manufacturer to be held liable for not providing warnings
directly to consumers. Indeed, the language in Hill leaves the possibility
open that any marketing efforts by a pharmaceutical company could
conceivably be the factor that tips the scales in favor of liability for
failure to warn. While marketing activities, in extreme form, might in a
rare case justify an exception to the learned intermediary rule, one would
hope that the underlying facts surrounding those activities-and not the
mere existence of such activities-would form the basis for the exception.
5. FDA Regulations Required Warnings
Directly to the Consumer
The Hill court rather summarily concluded, based on the foregoing
factors, that "in the case of IUDs, prescribing physicians do not make an
individualized medical judgment,"' and thus '"Hil's treating physician
was not an intervening party."" Subsequently, almost as an after-
thought, the court added that "[ilt was feasible to warn Hill" and,
"[m]oreover, such warning is required by FDA regulation.""I
The presence of FDA regulations has been similarly relied upon in
another case, Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp."9  In
Lukaszewicz, the court employed a negligence per se theory to impose
liability upon the manufacturer of an oral contraceptive based on its
failure to comply with federal package insert requirements.19 The
Lukaszewicz holding, however, creates not so much an exception to the
learned intermediary rule as it implies a state cause of action based on a
violation of existing federal regulations. Likewise, in Hill there was a
dispute as to whether the patient had received the FDA-required
warnings. 9 Thus, insofar as it was willing to base a damages claim on




"0 510 F. Supp. 961, modified, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981). See supra notes
133-38 and accompanying text.
m Lukasze'cz, 510 F. Supp. at 965 (applying 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (1975), which
required manufactuers of oral contraceptives to include warnings in the form of package
inserts to be distnbuted to patients as well as physicians).
m Hill, 884 F.2d at 1066.
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failure to comply with such regulations, the decision in Hill is not entirely
without precedent. However, the Hill court made it clear that it was
creating a categorical exception for IUDs, not one limited to cases in
which noncompliance with federal regulations was established. 93
6. The "Clinic-Type Conditions" Under
Which IUDs Are Given
The Hill court's bald assertion that IUDs are usually inserted under
"clinic-type conditions" attempts to analogize IUD cases to those
involving mass immunizations." This analogy echoes the theme that
physicians do not exercise medical judgment in prescribing IUDs and
ignores the physician's nondelegable duties to inform herself and her
patient before commencing treatment or prescribing drugs."5 Indeed,
the Hill court's attempt to analogize IUD practice to the mass immuniza-
tion practice is perhaps the chief flaw of the decision.
The court's consideration of the various factors listed above was
triggered by language in the landmark vaccine case Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, which the court erroneously interpreted as requiring a
case-by-case inquiry into the nature of the physician-patient relationship
in order to determine whether to apply the learned intermediary rule. The
language in Reyes on which the Hill court relied stated "that there must
either be a warning-meaningful and complete so as to be understood by
the recipient-or an individualized medical judgment that this treatment
or medication is necessary and desirable for this patient."'" The Reyes
holding is well-established and is the source of a continuing line of cases
concerning the mass immunization exception to the learned intermediary
rule. However, reliance on the Reyes holding in a case such as Hill is
entirely misplaced.
Reyes and its progeny concern prophylactic dispensation of vaccines,
typically by nurses or other nonphysicians at public health clinics where
there either is no doctor or there is not an established physician-patient
' Id. at 1071 ("[W]e think that in the case of IUDs, prescribing physicians do not
make an individualized medical judgment:).
'" Id. (citing Plummer v. Lederle Lab., 819 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1987)). See £uqra notes
75-87 and accompanying text (discussing the mass immunization exception).
' See CGThooley, supra note 13, at 653-58 (discussing the rationale and nature of
informed consent doctrine).
m 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974). The Reyes court, in fact, was operating in the
limited field of mass immunizations and did not opine as to the physician-patient
relationship in other contexts.
"w Hill, 884 F.2d at 1070 (citing Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1295).
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relationship.'" Most courts have held that the mere presence of a
physician-patient relationship, even if the actual administering of the drug
is done by a nurse, invokes the learned intermediary rule.'" Such an
approach has two distinct advantages. First, it places manufacturers and
physicians in their appropriate roles. Thus, as noted in a recent decision:
The [manufacturer] cannot control the individual practices of the
medical community [even if prevailing practice in the locale is for
doctors to delegate important functions], and we decline to impose such
a duty. Drug manufacturers must adequately warn physicians of the
potential side-effects of their prescription drugs; thereafter, the
physician, with his special knowledge of the patient's needs, assumes the
burden of presiding over the patient's best interests 2 °
The second advantage of this more limited construction of the mass
immunization exception is that it recognizes the impracticability of
conducting a factual inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each
prescription of a drug and instead presumes that the learned intermediary
rule will apply unless special factors dictate otherwise. One such factor
would be the absence of a physician-patient relationship. However, a
mere perceived lack of particular qualities in that relationship does not
warrant an exception to the learned intermediary rule. The mass immuni-
zation exception as described in Reyes is thus best viewed as a narrow
exception to the learned intermediary rule, not as the foundation for a
,See supra notes 75-87 and accompanying text.
SSee Hurley v. Ledefle Lab., 863 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir. 1988) (rejecting the
argument that a nurse-administered vaccine that took place while the physician was out
of the office amounted to a "clinic-like" environment, since the physician prescribed the
vaccine); Swayze v. McNeil Lab., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1987) (distinguish-
ing the Reyes case, where the vaccine was administered in 'assembly line' fashion," from
the facts at bar, where although the anesthesia was administered by a nurse, the
supervising physician was nevertheless considered the learned intermediary). But see
Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that if vaccine
administration in private physician's office was conducted "more hke that at a small
county health clinic," the mass immunization exception would apply despite the
physician's presence). The precedential weight of Ghen is suspect in light of the more
recent Fifth Circuit cases cited supra. In any event, the more recent approach is obviously
more in keeping with Reyes, which called for a specific limited exception and did not
envisage an i into the factors surounding each individual prescription before
applying the learned intermediary rule.
2o Swayze, 807 F.2d at 472. It should be noted in this regard that the foreseeability
of the absence of a learned internediary is a significaMt factor in mass immunization
cases. See cases cited supra note 82.
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new approach to the rule requiring detailed examination of the underlying
facts and circumstances surrounding every drug prescription.
B. Breast Implants
Like IUDs, breast implants are susceptible to many of the distinctions
on which exceptions to the learned intermediary rule have been justified.
Despite the fact that courts have thus far generally applied the learned
intermediary rule in breast implant failure-to-warn cases,"' cases such
as Hill indicate the very real potential for judicial abrogation of the rule
in this scenario. Moreover, because a serious challenge to the rule's
application in breast implant cases has yet to be raised,2° the likely
response of the courts remains open to speculation.2 .3
In light of the creation of yet another categorical exception to the
learned intermediary rule for IUDs in Hill v. Searle Laboratories" and
despite the still uncertain issue of preemption,2 5 a direct assault on the
doctrine's application in breast implant cases will, no doubt, soon be
"' See, e.g., Toole v. McClintock 778 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Lee v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md. 1989); Desmarais v. Dow Coming Corp., 712
F. Supp. 13 (D. Corn. 1989); Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. CL App.
1983).
' For instance, the courts in the four cases cited supra note 201 accepted the learned
intermediary rule's application either implicitly or without significant discussion. See
Toole, 778 F. Supp. at 1547 (noting without comment that "[t]he jury was also told that
under the 'learned intermediary' doctrine, the manufacturer did not have to warn [the
patient] about the dangers of its product, but only had to warn [the treating physician]");
Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 95 (applying learned intermediary rule after brief discussion of cases
applying rule to heart catheter and pacemaker) (citing Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Ind.,
836 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987) (heart catheter) and Brooks v. Mediwnic, Inc., 750 F.2d
1227 (4th Cir. 1984) (pacemaker)); Desmarais, 712 F. Supp. at 17-18 (accepting without
discussion learned intermediary rule's application); Perf, 662 P.2d at 650-51 (implicitly
accepting the learned intermediary rle by refuting as factually inaccurate defendant's
assertion that jury instruction allowed finding of duty to warn patient directly).
n' What is relatively clear is that future challenges to the rule will be raised. See In
re Oklahoma Breast Implant Cases, 847 P.2d 772, 774 (Okla. 1993) (explaining standards
for use of deposition of nonparties at pending trial with example that deposition
concerning "information furnished to the physician arguably in satisfaction of the learned
intermediary rule" would require written designation of intention to use such testimony);
First Mate-Court Breast Implant Class Action Certfied, PR Newswire, Apr. 17, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File ("Common defenses by implant
manufacturers, according to several lawyers, will [include] possibly aleamed intermediary
defense where manufacturers blame plastic surgeons.".
2 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989).
2 See supra note 168.
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waged. Breast implants have many of the same characteristics that
initially led some courts to carve out exceptions to the rule in cases of
oral contraceptives and vaccines, and are also analogous in many respects
to IUDs, which the Hill court recently excepted from the rule. Since the
Hill court based its decision on a virtual cornucopia of factors, it is likely
that a breast implant plaintiff hoping to circumvent the learned intermedi-
ary rule would take a similar tack. Indeed, the factors asserted by the Hill
court would likely play a prominent role in such an argument.2° Thus,
several of the factors enunciated in Hill warrant brief discussion.
The elective nature of breast implants will no doubt be asserted as a
factor in favor of a departure from the learned intermediary rule. In the
oral contraceptive exception cases, the courts made much of the fact that
women, and not their doctors, initiated consideration of birth control pills
as a course of treatment. This factor indicated to those courts that the
physician-patient relationship in the context of oral contraceptives was
qualitatively different from that found in typical drug treatments, with the
patient's role in selecting the course of treatment being much more
pronounced and the physician's role being correspondingly diminished.
This peculiarity seemingly undermined the rationale behind the rule and
thus led the courts to require direct manufacturer-to-patient warnings.2 7
Obviously, breast implants raise many similar concerns.
First, like oral contraceptives, breast implants are generally elective
devices. One source estimates that "[a]bout 80 percent of the 1 million
women who have silicone gel-filled implants have them for augmenta-
tion ' and "[tihe rest have the devices for reconstruction after
mastectomies or other disfigurement."2" Thus, patient demand for
breast implants might indeed lead to an atypical situation in which
patients visit a physician and request a particular treatment, rather than
complain of a malady in hopes that the physician will recommend a
suitable treatment. It does not follow, however, that this scenario calls for
abandonment of the learned intermediary rule.
As previously discussed,210 the mere fact that the patient requests
a treatment does not absolve the physician of his or her duty to obtain the
patient's informed consent. Doctors are legally bound to exercise
independent medical judgment and are not free to acquiesce in a patient's
See suipra notes 170-200 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88-142 and accompanying text.
2 Silicone Breast Implants to Be Restricted, UPI, Apr. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis I1brary, UPI File.
2 9Id.
20 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
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requests for treatment without first weighing the advisability of the treatment
and informing the patient of attendant risks2 "1 Similarly, a breast implant
manufacturer, who is not required to warn patients directly in large part
because there is no direct manufacture-patient contact, is placed in no
better position to warn patients just because patients request the manufactur-
er' product. Thus, the distinctions relied upon so heavily in the oral
contraceptives cases and espoused by the Hill court as applied to IUDs not
only fail to support abandonment of the learned intermediary rule as applied,
but are equally unpersuasive in breast implant cases.
The lack of physician supervision of the "use" of breast implants might
also be asserted against application of the learned intermediary rule to breast
implants. In the oral contraceptives cases the fact that patients are essentially
on their own after receiving the initial prescription/insertion was found to
justify an exception to the learned intermediary rule 3 This certainly occurs
in breast implant cases, but is qualitatively distinguishable. No amount of
knowledge of risks on the part of a woman who has received breast implants
can help her eliminate the risks to which she has been exposed. In this regard,
it would seem that the warnings applicable to breast implant cases, as
with IUDs, are of the informed-choice variety-decreasing risks is not a
truly viable objective of such warnings. It follows that another of the
objectives attributed to requiring manufacturer-to-patient warnings with
oral contraceptives-providing written warnings that the patient can digest over
time-is largely misplaced in breast implant cases. The value of written
warnings is drastically lessened in the case of informed consent warnings,
particularly those regarding medical devices, because the time to weigh the
costs and benefits of a medical device is before having the device implanted,
not afterward.
The lack of physician supervision also relates to the issue of the
physiciant and the manufaturert relative abilities to provide effective
warnings. Some commentators calling for abandonment of the learned
intermediary rule point to the need for written warnings and the manufactur-
er supposed greater capacity to provide them as justification for abandon-
ment of the nile.' 4 However, in medical device cases the nature of the risks
and, hence, the warnings are such that oral communication is probably an
-1 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
21 See Paul Rhoingold, Products Liability-The Ethical DrugMamtaUrf 's Liability,
18 RUTGERS L. REv. 947, 987 (1964) ('It would be virtually impossible for a anufactur-
or to comply with the duty of direct waming, as there is no sure way to reach the
patient."); infra note 235.
1 See supra notes 98, 119, 126 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 183.
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adequate means of conveying the warnings. The typical risks associated with
breast implants are rupture and leakage,215 events simple enough to explain
to the average patient K1 indeed, it is true that the complexity of the
information regarding oral contraceptives is too great to communicate briefly
and through oral communication, it has yet to be proven that the same
situation exists with breast implants. Mere conclusory statements to the
contrary should not be taken at face value and should not result in a breast
implant exception to the learned intermediary rle.
Potential challenges to the learned intermediary rule in implant cases
might place great weight on the fact that breast implants are not only elective,
as are IUDs, but are perhaps more often than not used for cosmetic purposes
wholly independent of any medical or functional need? 6 However, just as
the increased role of the patient in deciding to seek birth control and in
choosing which form to use does not justify an exception to the learned
intermediary rule, the heightened elective nature of breast implant treatment
does not detract from the need for the learned intermediary rule. In the final
analysis, it is the existence of the physician-patient relationship that makes
manufacturer-to-patient warnings impractical and, in many respects,
inadvisable. The exact nature of the treatment is irrelevant.
C Other Medical Devices
Courts have generally continued to apply the learned intermediary rule in
cases involving medical devices other than IUDs and breast implants.2 7 In
general, the application of the learned intermediary rule in such cases is
immune to the principal challenges set forth in the oral contraceptive, IUD,
and breast implant cases (ie., elective nature of treatment, decreased physician
involvement in decision-making process) due to the nature of the treatment
involved? 8 In this respect, cases involving more traditional implants and
devices do not present as fertile ground for challenges to the learned
intermediary rule as do IUD and breast implant cases.
215 Silicone Breast Implants to Be Restricted, UPI, Apr. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS
Library, UPI File.2' 6 &e supra note 209 and accompanying txt
2'7 E.g., Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993) (heart
valve); Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Indus., 836 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987) (heart catheter);
Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984) (pacemaker); Bukowski v.
Coopervision Inc., 592 N.Y.S.2d 807 (App. Div. 1993) (contact lens).
211 In carving out an exception to the learned intermediary rule, IUD and breast
implant decisions focus on the patient's inceased role in the decision-making process and
the elective nature of the treatment. See Hill, 884 F.2d at 1071 (citations omitted).
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In Brooks v. Medronic, Inc.,219 appellant-plaintiff challenged the
application of the learned intermediary rule to a failure to warn of the
dangers associated with the pacemaker he had received. The court
rejected appellant's attempt to invoke the rationale of the mass immuniza-
tion exception, finding that "pacemakers are not dispensed indiscriminate-
ly in mass clinics, but instead are prescribed only after a physician
balances the individual's needs against the known risks.' The court
likewise rejected "[a]ppellant's attempt to tread his way around' 1 the
rule on the ground that the manufacturer "had advance notice of his
surgery and therefore had ample opportunity to provide him with a
warning." The court found that the physician-patient relationship
warranted the application of the learned intermediary rule, noting that in
some cases additional warnings from the manufacturer to the patient
could pose "unwanted, unsettling and potentially harmful risks" to the
patient.?
A similar attempt to distinguish device cases from prescription drug
cases was rejected in Phelps v. Sherwood Medical Industries.' In
Phelps, a patient who had received a heart catheter urged an exception to
the learned intermediary rule based on distinctions between medical
devices and prescription drugs. However, the court could "find no
principled basis for such a distinction '  and held that the learned
intermediary rule was applicable to medical devices'
As Brool and Phelps indicate, courts have generally been unrecep-
tive to asserted grounds for distinguishing prescription drug cases from
cases involving medical devices. As between traditional medical devices
and those devices considered more elective in nature, such as IUDs and
breast implants, the former obviously leaves less room for the distinctions
relied upon in carving out exceptions for oral contraceptives and IUDs.
Nonetheless, even where the medical device is entirely elective, or even
cosmetic, if such a device is implanted by a physician treating his patient,
the application of the learned intermediary rule best recognizes the
respective capabilities of manufacturer and physician and best facilitates
adequate and effective warning to patients. At the heart of the learned
-9 750 F.2d 1227 (4th Cir. 1984).




2 836 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1987).




intermediary rle is a respect for the physician-patient relationship. In those
rare cases, such as mass immunization programs, where such a relationship
is not established, it is proper to ignore the learned intermediary rule.
However, once the physician-patient relationship is established the rule should
be applied, be it in the context of a life-saving heart valve transplant or a
breast augmentation for purely aesthetic purposes.
D. The Costs and Beefits of the Learned Intermediary Rule
One of the chief systemic benefits of the learned intermediary rule is its
tendency to reinforce expected results and thus provide relevant
parties-particularly physicians and drug and medical device manufactur-
em-prior notice of the duties expected of them. 7 Ad hoc departures from
the rule necessarily upset these expectations. Nevertheless, such depaMe
can, and do, occur. Armed with what might have seemed an exhaustive list
of factors supporting its decision, the court in Hill v. Searle Laboratoriesm
was apparently comfortable with its decision to require Tanufacturers of
IUDs to warn consumers directly, despite the fact that when the manufacturer
in that case sold its product it had every reason to believe that its duty to
warn had been discharged by physicians. While in the abstract the court
could, and did, quite naturally conclude that requiring manufacturer-to-
consumer warnings could only help matters, in practice the decision is
misguided. The problem with the result in Hill, and other calls for abandon-
ment of the learned intermediary rule, is that they overlook significant
benefits achieved through use of the learned intermediary rule, misconstrue
the central justifications for the rule, and drastically underestimate the
practical difficulties manufacturers would face if they were required to
provide legally sufficient warnings directly to patients.
It is intuitive that the more warnings available to a patient, the better off
the patient will be. Thus, in requiring manufactuers to warn IUD recipients
directly, courts like Hill see themselves as furthering such admirable goals as
patient autonomy and safe and effective use ofprescription drugs and devices.
In reality, manufacturers are unable to tailor warnings to patients and must
therefore provide standardized warnings to all patients, risking both dilution
and unnecessary hysteria due to the need to adequately warn all potential
patients of all potential hazards.
m See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
" 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989); see supra notes 170-200 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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The need to reduce warnings into layman's terms is a virtually
insurmountable task manufacturers would face in attempting to satisfy a
duty to warn all patients directly. Whereas the lexicon of medicine is
universal among physicians, regional and demographic differences among
the populace in general make effective standardized warnings impossible.
This factor is exacerbated by the heretofore painfully uncertain science
of failure-to-warn litigation. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharraceutical ' is
an excellent case-in-point.
InMacDonald, FDA-required inserts accompanying oral contraceptive
pills warned patients of the risk of"[b]lood clots [that] occasionally form
in the blood vessels ... and may threaten life if the clots break loose and
then lodge in the lung or if they form in other vital organs, such as the
brain." 1 Despite the apparent clarity of this warning, the court ruled
that it was for a jury to decide whether the company should have
explicitly warned of the risk of a "stroke," which the plaintiff asserted
would have caused her to forgo use of the product.'
Obviously, holdings such as MacDonald pose serious threats to
physicians as well as manufacturers. But physicians, at least, have the
advantage of knowing their patients and thus some opportunity to ensure
that the patients comprehend warnings. Manufacturers have no similar
opportunity. Forced not only to warn each patient but also to satisfy
a fact-finder's hindsight estimation of what an appropriate warning would
have been, a manufacturer would be subject to potentially crippling
liability with no real means of meeting its duty. The inevitable result of
such a predicament is the exodus of manufacturers from the market.
230 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass.), cert. denIed, 474 U.S. 920 (1985); see supra notes 89-107
and accompanying text.
231 MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 67 n.4.
232 Id. at 71.
23 See Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just for Doctors: Applying the Learned
Intermediary Doctnne to the Relationship Between Chemical Mangacturs, Indusrial
Employers, and Employees, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 562, 567 (1991) (noting that the
distnbution systems for prescription drugs may cause a manufacturer to become
"separated from the users of its products," leaving the manufacturer "unable to anticipate
and meet its user's informational needs" (citing Clarke E. Khoury, Note, Warning Labels
May be Hazardous to Your Health. Common-Law and &atutory Responses to Alcoholic
Beverage Mawufacturers' Duty to Warn, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 185 (1989))).
' See Flannagan, supra note 39, at 420 & n.90 (discussing the risk that the vague
standard applied in MacDonald could "prompt oral contraceptive manufacturers to
withdraw their product from the market' and comparing the situation to vaccine




In essence, the sort of protracted inquiry undertaken in Hill defeats
the purpose of the learned intermediary rule. The rule, as originally
adopted and generally still applied, recognizes the respective roles of
physician and manufacturer and actually ensures that useful warnings
reach the consumer. In other words, the original justifications for the
learned intermediary rule justify its continued application and its
extension to medical device cases.
Abrogation of the rule not only contradicts the objectives of providing
adequate warnings in the most effective manner, but also upsets
established expectations. Manufacturers such as the defendant in Hill and
the defendants in the oral contraceptive cases had directed warning
information to physicians because established legal principles indicated
that it was their duty to direct the information to the physician, not the
patient. Holding such manufacturers liable, after the fact, for inadequately
warning the patient directly blatantly upsets the manufacturer's reasonable
expectations. The manufacturer in these cases had no direct contact with
the patient and reasonably relied on the established rule that its duty to
warn was discharged by warning the treating physician. In essence, then,
the mere existence of the learned intermediary rule, because the manufac-
turer is expected to conform its behavior to that rule, provides consider-
able weight against further ad seriatim abandonment such as that
undertaken in Hill.
E. A Legislative Approach
Two cases that have thus far been treated more or less as anomalies
might, in fact provide guidance in reconciling demands for greater
patient warnings with the policy objectives embodied by the learned
intermediary rule. The first of these cases is Lukaszewicz v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.,' which allowed a failure-to-warn claim to
proceed on a negligence per se theory based on a violation of federal
regulations. 7  The second case is Desmarais v. Dow Coming
Corp.,' which found that state failure-to-warn claims concerning
... See He-nderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 302-03 (describing "seriatim effect"
as a weakness of failure-to-warn jurisprudence due to a poor fit between case-by-case
adjudication system and the need to consider a broad range of factors in determining the
adequacy of warnings).
2m 510 F. Supp. 961, modified, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
237 See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
2m 712 F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989).
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breast implants were preempted by federal regulation. 9 Simply put, the
advantage in each case is that determination of what constitutes adequate
warning and, more importantly in this context, to whom such warning
should extend was made in advance by a legislative or quasi-legislative
body capable of considering a more expansive range of facts than that
presented in a single lawsuit.
In Lukaszewicz, the cause of action was based on the manufacturer's
failure to comply with federal labeling requirements.' The court did
not, on its own, decide that the particular facts of the case before it
warranted direct manufacture-to-patient warnings. Instead, a fact-finding
body--the Food and Drug Administration-determined that such warnings
were necessary and dictated the content of the warnings. Such an agency
determination is typically made after consideration of a more comprehen-
sive set of factors than can properly and effectively be considered in a
judicial setting. Moreover, the legislative and rule-making processes are
equipped to resist the natural tendency to assume that one more warning
is almost always cost-justified without considering the hidden costs of
piling on warnings.
Likewise, the Desmarais court's finding that state failure-to-warn
claims are preempted by federal regulation recognizes the relative
strengths of legislative and judicial bodies in determining proper
warnings. Courts are designed to resolve particular disputes. Courts are
not equipped to set particularized standards, the establishment of which
often entails minutiae such as phraseology and placement. The "empty
shell of failure to warn ' 42 is plagued by after-the-fact determinations
and demands legislative, rather than judicial, law making. The determina-
tions of what constitutes adequate warning and to whom such warning
should be extended cannot fairly and responsibly be made on an ad-hoc
basis.
For these reasons, Desmarais and Lukaszewicz might be indicative of
the ideal course for failure-to-warn cases in that pre-determined legislative
standards represent the best hope for a proper balance. Once such
standards have been set, the courts should respect the balance that the
legislature or administrative body has struck. In any event, the default
"9 See supra note 168.
2- Lukaszewicz, 510 F. Supp. at 964-65 (requiring the labeling of oral contraceptives).
2' See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 33, at 296-303 (generally discussing the
risk-utility balancing of warnings); supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
2 See Henderson & TwersKi, mpra note 33, at 265 (referring to the decreased
effectiveness of the failure to wam doctrine in influencing manufacturer's conduct because
courts have diluted the doctrine through overuse).
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position--applicable when no legislative or administrative determination
has been made-should be continued reliance on the learned intermediary
rule.
CONCLUSION
Consideration of IUD and breast implant cases perhaps best under-
scores the basis for the continuing need for the learned intermediary rule:
regardless of the motivation behind the treatment, regardless of the
elective nature of the treatment, and regardless of the physician's degree
of participation in the decision-making process, the intervention of the
physician-patient relationship between manufacturer and patient puts all
parties on notice that the doctor has fully assumed the role of adviser and
counselor. This allows for effective, unobstructed warning on the
physician-patient end of the transaction, and allows the manufacturer to
fulfill its duty to warn by warning the only party it can warn effective-
ly-the treating physician. Increasing the number of warnings to patients
and the number of parties required to warn the patient does not facilitate
more effective warnings, and can actually hinder such warnings.
Moreover, requiring direct manufacturer-to-patient warnings, except in
situations where more responsive fact-finding bodies predetermine the
nature of such a duty, risks placing manufacturers in a hopelessly
untenable position. Piecemeal abrogation of the learned intermediary rule
only serves to increase the cost of doing business for all parties, without
a corresponding return on the consumer's investment, and creates untold
costs in the form of unheeded and unheedable warnings.
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